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I. INTRODUCTION
Rapid advances in technology are forcing society to reevaluate
traditional notions of human reproduction, family relationships and
the law. Many of these advances have made it feasible to separate the
functions of conception, gestation and child rearing in ways not previ-
ously thought possible. In vitro fertilization allows conception to oc-
cur outside the womb. Widespread use of artificial insemination calls
into question traditional presumptions of paternity. Through a tech-
nique known as embryo transfer, it is now possible for a woman to
give birth to a child who is wholly unrelated to her in a genetic sense.1
Reports of surrogacy arrangements, such as the one involving Baby
Cotton, have become commonplace.2 Surrogacy and embryo dona-
tions may require a fundamental redefinition of motherhood. Specifi-
cally, three different women may lay claim to the title of "mother":
the woman providing the egg for fertilization, the woman who carries
the child during pregnancy, and the woman who raises the child after
birth.
These developments have prompted many governments and other
interested groups to study the social, ethical and legal implications of
new reproductive technologies.3 In the United Kingdom, the Commit-
1. Boy's Birth Is First from Embryo Transfer, Washington Post, Feb. 4,1984, at A14,
col. 1-5.; Annas, Surrogate Embryo Transfer: The Perils of Patenting, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., June, 1984, at 25.
2. Baby Cotton was born on January 4, 1985, in London, England. She was con-
ceived by artificial insemination pursuant to an agreement between the mother,
an English housewife named Kim Cotton, and the father, an American man
whose wife was unable to bear children. Upon her birth, Baby Cotton was placed
in the custody of her father. Mrs. Cotton received $10,000 for her services. The
circumstances surrounding the birth of Baby Cotton were widely reported in the
press. Helm, Webster, Wilsher & Hosenball, How to Buy a Baby, Sunday Times
(London) Jan. 13, 1985, at 15, col. 1.
3. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO HUMAN FERTILISATION AND
EMBRYOLOGY (1984) (United Kingdom) [hereafter cited as WARNOCK REPORT];
ETHICS ADVISORY BD. OF THE DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, RE-
PORT AND CONCLUSIONS: HEW SUPPORT OF RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN IN VI-
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tee of Inquiry Into Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Warnock
Committee) recently issued its report on these technologies. While
most of its findings and recommendations favor continued use and de-
velopment of these technologies,4 there is one significant exception. A
majority of the committee found surrogate motherhood as commonly
practiced to be ethically unacceptable. As a result, the committee rec-
ommended the passage of legislation declaring surrogacy agreements
illegal and making the operation of commercial surrogacy agencies a
criminal offense.5 The recently enacted Surrogacy Arrangements Act
of 19856 partially implements the committee's recommendations.
The position of the Warnock Committee and the Surrogacy Ar-
rangements Act are ill-advised. They both stem from the assumption
that surrogate parenthood is an immoral practice. A large portion of
this article challenges that proposition. Surrogate parenting agree-
ments are not inherently immoral and, within certain guidelines,
should be enforceable. The dangers of commercialism that concerned
the Warnock Committee and that underlie the Surrogacy Arrange-
ments Act can be addressed more appropriately through regulation as
opposed to outright criminalization. The legislation, moreover, is es-
pecially shortsighted. It addresses only one facet of the many complex
issues presented by surrogate parenting. By imposing criminal sanc-
tions, the Act purports to eliminate commercial brokers, but does not
TRO FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYO TRANSFER, 44 Fed. Reg. 35,034 (1979); Human
Embryo Transfer, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Over-
sight of the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1984); COUNCIL FOR SCIENCE AND SOCIETY, HUMAN PROCREATION: ETHICAL AS-
PECTS OF THE NEW TECHNIQUES (1984) [hereafter cited as HUMAN PROCREATION];
ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMM., REPORT ON HUMAN ARTIFICIAL REPRODUCTION
AND RELATED MATTERS (1985) [hereafter cited as ONTARIO REPORT]. In Victoria,
Australia, the Committee to Consider the Social, Ethical and Legal Issues Arising
from In Vitro Fertilization (the Waller Committee) has delivered a number of
reports. See Bravender-Coyle, Medical Experiments and the Law, 59 LAw INST. J.
63 (1985).
4. The Committee recommended that artificial insemination by donor (AID), in vi-
tro fertilization, egg donation, and one technique of embryo donation be accepted
as treatments for infertility. These techniques would be permissible treatments,
however, only as prescribed by a newly established licensing authority. The li-
censing authority would regulate both infertility research and services. The
Committee also proposed that the licensing authority oversee the development of
technologies involving the use of frozen sperm, egg and embryos. For a more
detailed summary of the Report, see Priest, The Report of the Warnock Commit-
tee on Human Fertilisation and Embryology, 48 MOD. L. REv. 73 (1985); Note,
The Warnock Report - I, 128 SOLIC. J. 673 (1984).
5. WARNOCK REPORT, supra note 3, §§ 8.18, 8.19. Two committee members dis-
sented from that portion of the Report dealing with surrogacy. The dissenters
would approve of surrogate motherhood arrangements made by non-profit agen-
cies acting under an appropriate license. WARNOCK REPORT, supra note 3, at 87-
89 (dissenting views of Greengross and Davies).
6. Surrogacy Arrangements Act, 1985, ch. 49 (United Kingdom) (1985).
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condemn surrogacy arrangements themselves. The Act thus encour-
ages amateurish agreements that are likely to lead to disputes. The
legislation is silent, however, on how such disputes should be resolved.
This Article analyzes the Warnock Report and the Surrogacy Ar-
rangements Act in light of existing practices and laws in the United
States and Great Britain. Section II provides a description of surro-
gacy practices and the uncertain legal environment in which they op-
erate. Section III compares the Surrogacy Arrangements Act with
Canadian, American, and Australian legislative proposals. Section IV
then examines in more detail the commonly voiced ethical objections
to surrogacy agreements and concludes that these objections do not
warrant criminalization of surrogacy agreements. Finally, Section V
offers suggestions on the enforcement of surrogacy agreements.
II. THE CURRENT STATUS OF SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD
A. The Basic Transaction
There are two basic situations in which surrogacy agreements
might be used. The most common pattern involves a husband and
wife unable to have children of their own, often because of the wife's
infertility.7 In order to have a child who is genetically related to one
of them, they seek the assistance of another woman, commonly called
a surrogate mother. The surrogate agrees to conceive a child of the
husband through artificial insemination and carry the child to term.
The surrogate further agrees to surrender custody of the child to the
father at birth and relinquish her parental rights. The process usually
contemplates a formal adoption of the child by the wife.8
A second pattern involving embryo transfer may be used in cases
where a woman is fertile, but is unable to carry a child to term.9 In
7. Ten percent of married couples are unable to conceive a child after attempting to
do so for a year. The wife is infertile in approximately half of these marriages.
The chief causes of female infertility are hormonal imbalances or problems with
the fallopian tubes. R. GLASS & R. ERICSON, GETING PREGNANT IN THE 1980s:
NEW ADVANCES IN INFERTILITY TREATMENT AND SEX PRESELECTION 7 (1982).
8. Unless otherwise indicated, general references to surrogate motherhood used
throughout this Article will refer to situations where the surrogate is genetically
related to the child. For other descriptions of surrogate motherhood practices,
see L. ANDREWS, NEW CONCEPTIONS: A CONSUMER'S GUIDE TO THE NEWEST IN-
FERTILITY TREATMEENTS INCLUDING IN VITRO FERTILIZATION, ARTIFICIAL INSEMI-
NATION AND SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 197-243 (1984); Cohen, Surrogate Mothers:
Whose Baby Is It?, 10 AM. J. L. & MED. 243 (1984); Keane, Legal Problems of
Surrogate Motherhood, 1980 S. ILL. U.L.J. 147; Lorio, Alternative Means of Repro-
duction: Virgin Territory for Legislation, 44 LA. L. REv. 1642 (1984); Sappideen,
The Surrogate Mother-A Growing Problem, 6 U.N.S.W. L.J. 79 (1983). For a
clause by clause review of a typical surrogacy agreement, see Brophy, A Surro-
gate Mother Contract to Bear a Child, 20 J. FAM. L. 263 (1982).
9. Department of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and Related Agen-
cies Appropriations for 1985: Hearings Before Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
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this situation the father and genetic mother may conceive an embryo
through in vitro fertilization and then have it implanted in the womb
of the surrogate. The surrogate would carry and give birth to the
child. In this pattern, which is rarely used in practice,10 the surrogate
bears only a gestational relationship to the child.
In either of these variations, the contracting couple generally
agrees to pay a substantial fee to the surrogate and to pay for medical
expenses associated with the pregnancy. As was the case with those
involved in the birth of Baby Cotton, a commercial agency often
brings the commissioning couple and the surrogate mother together.
It is the payment of a fee and the involvement of a commercial agency
that raises the most objections. The presence of a fee and an agency
inject an element of commercialism and potential exploitation into
what is widely perceived as a profoundly sacred event-the birth of a
child.
No one knows exactly how widespread the practice of surrogate
motherhood is in the United States and Great Britain. Recent reports
estimate that six hundred babies have been born to surrogate mothers
in the United States and the number is growing." The parliamentary
debates concerning the Surrogacy Arrangements Act contain refer-
ences to "many" non-commercial surrogacy agreements being carried
out within families in Scotland.12 One British infertility specialist
confessed he did not know whether surrogacy practices involved 5 or
500 pregnancies.' 3 Given the increasing difficulty of procreating
within the marriage14 and dissatisfaction with traditional adoption,' 5 it
Appropriations, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1490 (1984) (justification of budget estimates,
National Institute of Child Health and Human Development). Some women are
the unfortunate victims of several different problems in successive pregnancies.
Others produce insufficient amounts of progesterone following pregnancy and do
not respond to hormonal treatment. Still others have immunological reactions to
their offspring, rejecting them as foreign material. See R. GLASS & R. ERICSON,
supra note 7, at 60-62.
10. The first case involving this pattern recently appeared. In an uncontested pro-
ceeding, a Michigan trial judge ruled that the genetic mother would be considered
the "legal" mother instead of the surrogate. Smith v. Jones, 85-532014DZ (3d.
Jud. Dist., Mich., March 14, 1986). For reports of this case, see Annas, The Baby
Broker Boom, HASTINGS CENTER REP., June, 1986 at 30; Parentage Decided for
Unborn Child of Surrogate Mother, Am. Medical News, Apr. 4, 1986, at 19.
11. Gelman & Shapiro, Infertility: Babies by Contract, Newsweek, Nov. 4, 1985, at 74.
Two attorneys active in this field claim to represent more than one hundred
couples in surrogate parenting arrangements. Lorio, supra note 8, at 1654;
Sherwyn & Handel v. Department of Social Services, 173 Cal. App. 3d 52, 55, 218
Cal. Rptr. 778, 780 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
12. 77 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 42 (1985) (remarks of Mr. Bruinvels).
13. Helm, Webster, Wilsher & Hosenball, supra note 2, at 15, col. 1 (quoting Dr. Jack
Glatt). The demand for surrogacy services is not limited to the United States and
Great Britain. Couples requesting surrogate services come from all over the
world. See L. ANDREWS, supra note 8, at 246.
14. Although the aggregate marital infertility rate of 10% remains relatively con-
[Vol. 65:686
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is reasonable to assume that the demand for surrogacy services will
continue at least at present levels.
B. The Legality of Surrogate Motherhood Agreements
Surrogate motherhood agreements are filled with legal uncer-
tainty. Disputes over the ethics and legality of surrogacy agreements
were unheard of ten years ago but are now reaching the courts. In the
absence of specific legislation, courts must rely upon statutes that
were not enacted with surrogacy arrangements in mind and upon the
nebulous concept of public policy. This section considers the uncer-
tain state of the law relating to surrogacy arrangements and the legal
obstacles this creates for a husband, his infertile wife, and a surrogate
who will conceive through artificial insemination. This is the most
common type of surrogacy arrangement and presents difficult legal
problems due to the surrogate's genetic relationship to the child.16
1. Adoption Laws
a. Prohibiting the Payment of Fees
The most serious potential impediments to surrogacy agreements
stant, infertility among younger couples has risen significantly. A continuation of
this trend could have significant demographic and social consequences. W. MO-
SHER & W. PRATT, REPRODUCTIVE IMPAIRMENTS AMONG MARRIED COUPLES:
UNITED STATES, VITAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS 16 (1982) (National Center for
Health Statistics).
15. The number of couples wanting to adopt healthy, white infants far exceeds the
ntimber of available children. The shortage of desired infants has created lengthy
waiting lists for adoptions. Many adoption agencies in the United States have
stopped taking applications. W. MEEZAN, S. KATz, & E. RUSSO, ADOPTIONS WITH-
OUT AGENCIES 35-36 (1978). An inadequate number of staff personnel adds fur-
ther delay to the progress. Consequently, the time between inquiry and
placement can be as long as five years. Id. Professors Landes and Posner propose
a controversial "free market" approach to this situation. Landes & Posner, The
Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978). For a thoughtful
and sensitive reply, see Prichard, A Market for Babies?, 34 U. TORONTO L.J. 341
(1984).
16. Surrogacy arrangements could also be used when a married woman is physically
capable of having her own children but chooses not to. Her motives might be to
avoid a genetically transmitted condition or a disruption in her career. Surrogacy
for personal convenience was strongly condemned by the Warnock Committee.
WARNOCK REPORT, supra note 3, at § 8.17. Others, however, view motive-based
restrictions on the availability of surrogacy services as unwise, unworkable, and
perhaps unconstitutional. Rassaby, Surrogate Motherhood: The Position and
Problems of Substitutes in TEST TUBE BABIES 105 (W. Walters, P. Singer, eds.
1982); Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy
and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 430 (1983). Furthermore, single males might
seek the services of a surrogate to enable them to become parents without incur-
ring the obligations of marriage. Single persons, either male or female, may be
suitable parents and are specifically provided for in laws regulating adoption.
See, Children Act, 1975, ch. 72 § 11. (United Kingdom).
1986]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
are statutes barring the payment of a fee to the natural mother in con-
nection with the adoption of her child. These so-called baby-buying
laws exist in the United Kingdom17 and are common in the United
States.' 8 Whether these provisions prohibit surrogacy arrangements
has not been definitively established. It is true that a fee is paid to the
surrogate mother and the process usually contemplates the adoption
of her child. One logical construction of the statute would invalidate
any surrogacy agreement in which the surrogate receives a fee. On
the other hand, the fee could be viewed not as consideration for any
subsequent adoption, but rather as consideration for the surrogate's
services in conceiving and carrying the child. More to the point, it is
quite clear that these baby-buying statutes were enacted with no
thought of surrogate motherhood. The evils to which these statutes
are addressed arguably do not include the noncoercive efforts of a
childless couple to produce a child to be raised by its father. Thus,
several commentators maintain that the statutory prohibition of pay-
ment of a fee should not preclude surrogacy arrangements. 19
The law in Great Britain is unsettled on this point. The Warnock
Committee did not take a position. It ambiguously concluded that sur-
rogacy agreements do not violate "existing criminal law, unless ...
[they] contravene the provisions of adoption law, which prohibit pay-
ments in connection with adoption."2 0 It could, perhaps, be in inferred
from the recent case of In re a Baby2 ' that surrogacy arrangements do
not contravene adoption laws. In that opinion, Mr. Justice Latey per-
mitted a child born to a surrogate mother to be placed in the custody
of her natural father and his wife, who then left the country. There is
no suggestion in that opinion that the surrogacy agreement itself was
illegal or violated any law. The court's sole concern was the best inter-
est of the child.
An earlier case, however, casts doubt on the legality of surrogacy
arrangements. In A v. C22 a man commissioned a prostitute to bear his
child by means of artificial insemination. The woman agreed to sur-
render custody of the child to the natural father, but changed her
mind after the child was born. The father sought custody of the child.
17. Adoption Act, 1958, 7 Eliz. 2, ch. 5, § 50 (United Kingdom).
18. Twenty-four states have baby-buying laws. For citations to specific statutes, see
Andrews, The Stork Market. The Law of the New Reproduction Technologies, 70
A.B.A. J. August, 1984, at 50, 54-55.
19. Keane, supra note 8, at 154-55; Comment, Surrogate Mothers: The Legal Issues, 7
AM. J.L. & MED. 323, 330-32 (1981).
20. WARNOCK REPORT, supra note 3, at § 8.4. The Surrogacy Arrangements Act itself
continues the ambiguity, stating that the Act applies to surrogacy arrangements
"whether or not they are lawful and whether or not they are enforceable." Sur-
rogacy Arrangements Act, 1985, ch. 49, § 1(9) (United Kingdom).
21. Re A Baby (1985) Times, Jan. 15 (Farn. Div.; Latey, J.).
22. 1978 Faro. 170. (Faro. Div. Ct.).
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It is reported that in denying the father's request, the judge de-
nounced the agreement as "pernicious" and amounting to the sale of a
human being.23 The father, although originally awarded access, had
all rights to the child revoked by the Court of Appeals.24
One obvious distinction between In re a Baby and A v. C is the
degree of cooperation of the surrogate. In the former case the surro-
gate mother did not contest the natural father's efforts to obtain cus-
tody, while in the latter case, the surrogate's opposition was vigorous.
Taken together, the two cases suggest that while surrogate mother-
hood agreements may not violate any criminal law in Great Britain,
they may be nonetheless unenforceable. Given the scant authority,
however, any speculation as to the legality of such agreements is
hazardous.
There is only limited authority in the United States on this isssue.
In several states, attorney general advisory opinions have concluded
that statutes prohibiting payment of fees in connection with adoptions
render commercial surrogacy arrangements illegal.25 These opinions
are only advisory, however, and are not binding on the courts. Recent
judicial decisions addressing the legality of surrogacy arrangements
have been more accepting of the practice, but even here ambiguity
remains.
Consider the experience in Michigan and Kentucky. Both states
have baby-selling statutes.2 6 In Doe v. Kelley,27 a childless couple con-
tracted with the husband's secretary to bear his child by means of arti-
ficial insemination. The couple feared that the Michigan adoption
laws would invalidate their agreement. They petitioned the court to
declare the baby-selling statute unconstitutional as an impermissible
interference with their right to procreate.28 The court upheld the
statute, reasoning that a married couple's constitutionally protected
23. Cusine, Womb Leasing: Some Legal Implications, 128 NEW L.J. 824 (1978).
24. Id at 825. Compare C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d 821 (Cumberland
County Ct. 1977) where the court awarded visitation rights to a sperm donor who
intended to take on the responsibilities of fatherhood. Cf. Jhordan v. Mary K., 12
Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 1320 (Cal. App. 1986) (sperm donor may claim paternity
where a woman inseminates herself with the donor's sperm).
25. Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 81-18 (1981); Ohio Op. Att'y Gen. 83-001 (1983); Okla. Op. Att'y
Gen. 83-162 (1983). The Attorney General of Louisiana reached a similar conclu-
sion in an informal letter. See Lorio, supra note 8, at 1656 n.74.
26. Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.590(2) (1984); MICH. CoMp. LAWS AINN. § 710.54 (Supp. 1985).
27. 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (Ct. App. 1981).
28. Professor Robertson asserts that procreative liberty includes not only the right to
avoid conception and pregnancy but also the right to reproduce. He views the
positive right to procreate as a necessary corollary to the United States Supreme
Court's decisions concerning abortion and contraception. The right to procreate,
like the right to decide to terminate a pregnancy, would be protected from gov-
ernmental interference by the fourteenth amendment. Under this theory, the
state bears a heavy burden to justify prohibiting certain procreational choices,
including surrogate motherhood. Robertson, supra note 16.
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right to bear a child does not include the right to pay a fee to a surro-
gate mother. The court thus assumed that commercial surrogacy ar-
rangements are prohibited by the statute and found prohibition
constitutionally permissible. The case comes very close to holding
that surrogacy arrangements are illegal.
The Michigan courts again considered surrogate motherhood in
Syrkowski v. Appleyard.29 The biological father sought an order of fil-
iation declaring him to be the father of the surrogate's child. An order
of filiation is a declaration of parenthood and is the first step toward a
father obtaining legal custody of a child. The surrogate mother had no
objection, but the Attorney General intervened in opposition to the
motion. The trial court refused to issue the order of filiation. In the
judge's view, Doe v. Kelley established that surrogate parenting ar-
rangements are contrary to public policy. The Paternity Act,30 the
court held, could not be used to facilitate an illegal agreement. The
Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, but on a
more limited basis. It refused to decide whether surrogate mother-
hood contracts contravene public policy, focusing instead on an inter-
pretation of legislative intent. The Paternity Act, the court reasoned,
was designed only for the purpose of providing support for children
born out of wedlock and was not intended to facilitate commercial sur-
rogate parenting agreements.3 1 The child's father again appealed.
In reversing the lower courts, the Supreme Court of Michigan took
a broader view of the Paternity Act. It agreed that the statute was
intended to secure support for illegitimate children. The clear lan-
guage of the act, however, authorized fathers of illegitimate children
to establish their paternity without regard to their reasons for doing
so. The court did not address any of the larger issues concerning sur-
rogate parenting and expressed "no opinion about the plaintiff's enti-
tlement to any other relief in the future."32
The Michigan appellate courts have had three opportunities to de-
clare all surrogacy agreements illegal and against public policy but
have not squarely done so. All we can be certain of at this point is that
the prohibition against payment of fees to the natural mother in adop-
tions is not unconstitutional33 and that the biological father within a
surrogacy agreement may legally establish his paternity of the child.
29. 122 Mich. App. 506, 333 N.W.2d 90 (Mich. App. 1983), rev'd and remanded, 420
Mich. 367, 362 N.W.2d 211 (1985).
30. MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 722.714(f) (Supp. 1985).
31. Syrkowski v. Appleyard, 122 Mich. App. 506, 515, 333 N.W.2d 90, 93-94 (Mich.
App. 1983).
32. Syrkowski v. Appleyard, 420 Mich. 367, 373, 362 N.W.2d 211, 214 (1985).
33. The state court of appeals decision in Doe v. Kelley, is not binding on other courts
insofar as the federal constitutional theory is concerned. Professor Robertson
maintains that the Michigan statute is unconstitutional as applied in Doe v. Kel-
ley. Robertson, supra note 16, at 427 n.63.
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Beyond these limited certainties the law in Michigan remains unclear.
Perhaps broader rulings will be made if Mr. Syrkowski attempts to
obtain custody and Ars. Syrkowski applies to adopt the child s4
The law in Kentucky is currently more settled, but its develop-
ment was not without controversy. The Attorney General of Ken-
tucky concluded in 1981 that surrogate motherhood contracts were
illegal under the state's adoption laws.3 5 Relying on this opinion, the
state sought to enjoin a commercial surrogacy agency from operating
in Kentucky. The lower court in Kentucky v. Surrogate Parenting As-
sociates,36 refused to issue the injunction, finding that the adoption
laws did not render the surrogate parenting agreement illegal. As
construed by the court, the agreement called for the payment of a fee
in consideration for the surrogate carrying the child and agreeing to
terminate her parental rights. The fee was, therefore, unrelated to
any subsequent adoption proceeding. The judge declared that the
state's case suffered from "a fundamental conceptual problem-how
can a natural father be characterized as either adopting or buying his
own baby?"37 Given the natural father's preexisting relationship to
the child, the baby-buying prohibition was viewed as inapplicable.
In apparent response to this decision, the Kentucky legislature
amended its laws to expressly prohibit the payment of a fee in consid-
eration for the termination of parental rights.3 8 Before passing this
legislation, the Kentucky Senate considered and rejected an amend-
ment that would have excluded surrogacy agreements from coverage
under the adoption laws. In reviewing the lower court's decision in
Surrogate Parenting Associates, the Kentucky Court of Appeals con-
sidered this legislative history as a clear statement of preexisting pub-
lic policy. It overruled the lower court and held that commercial
surrogate parenting agencies *operate in violation of Kentucky adop-
34. A lower Michigan court recently ruled that the woman who provides the egg to
be fertilized and implanted in the womb of the surrogate, is the "legal" mother of
the resulting child. Smith v. Jones, 85-532014 DZ (3d Jud. Dist., Mich., March 14,
1986). See supra note 10. This ruling will facilitate surrogacy arrangements in
cases involving embryo transfers. It must be emphasized, however, that the case
was uncontested and that the surrogate was making no claim to the child.
35. Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 81-18 (1981).
36. 10 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1105 (Ky. Cir. Ct. 1983).
37. Id at 1106. In permitting a natural parent to provide payment in connection with
the adoption of a child, one court has commented: "The fears that approval of
such a policy would lead to bartering or sale of children are not borne out when
we deal with agreements between parents or close family members." Reimche v.
First Nat'l Bank, 512 F.2d 187, 190 (9th Cir. 1975). This judicial reasoning is re-
flected in some statutes that prohibit the selling of children but exempt transac-
tions between the parents of a minor child. E.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.64.030 (Supp. 1984).
38. KY. REV. STAT. § 199.520(2) (Supp. 1984).
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tion laws.39
The final word in Surrogate Parenting Associates came in a re-
cently issued opinion of the Kentucky Supreme Court. After review-
ing the pertinent legislation, the court concluded that surrogate
parenting practices did not constitute the selling of babies. Such prac-
tices, therefore, did not contravene statutory prohibitions against pay-
ment of fees to natural mothers in connection with the adoption of her
child.40 The court found "fundamental differences" between surro-
gate parenting and the practices prohibited by the statute. The key
distinction is that surrogacy arrangements are entered into under non-
coercive circumstances before conception. Baby-selling statutes, on
the other hand, are intended to control commercial brokers who
would exploit expectant mothers who want to avoid the consequences
of an unwanted pregnancy or fear the financial burden of child rear-
ing.4 ' In essence, the court found surrogate parenting to be as accepta-
ble a form of reproductive technology as artificial insemination.
These recent decisions reflect some judicial tolerance, if not ap-
proval, of surrogate parenting. Through its construction of the Pater-
nity Act, the Michigan Supreme Court in Syrkowski cautiously
encouraged continued use of surrogacy agreements. The Kentucky
Supreme Court in Surrogate Parenting Associates issued the clearest
declaration to date that such practices do not constitute baby-selling.
Whether other states will follow these cases remains to be seen. At
this point in time, however, the application of baby-selling laws to sur-
rogacy practices is quite speculative.
b. Restrictions on Private Adoptions and Parental Consent
Restrictions on private adoptions and the general requirement of
securing parental consent are two common provisions that could affect
surrogate parenting arrangements. Neither of these provisions would
necessarily render surrogate motherhood contracts illegal. These pro-
visions could, however, make surrogate agreements difficult to
enforce.
The United Kingdom4 2 and many American states43 restrict pri-
39. Kentucky ex. reL Armstrong v. Surrogate Parenting Assoc., 11 Fain. L. Rep.
(BNA) 1359-60 (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 1985), rev'd, Surrogate Parenting Assoc. v.
Kentucky ex. rel Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986).
40. Surrogate Parenting Assoc. v. Kentucky ex. rel. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209, 211
(Ky. 1986).
41. Id. The court did state that surrogacy agreements are voidable insofar as custody
is concerned. Id. at 213. See notes 148-60 and accompanying text. For a critical
analysis of this decision, see Annas, supra note 10.
42. Adoption Act, 1976, ch. 36, § 11.
43. One survey found that six states completely ban the placement of children for
adoption outside government agencies, fourteen states forbid independent adop-
tions except in cases involving stepparents or close relatives and the remaining
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vate arrangements for placement of children available for adoption.
Surrogacy arrangements presumably would violate these prohibitions
against privately arranged adoptions. Some statutes, however, regu-
late but do not prohibit private adoptions. Furthermore, the restric-
tions commonly do not apply in cases of adoptions by "relatives,"
including stepparents. 44 In most surrogate parenting arrangements,
the adopting wife is married to the biological father of the illegitimate
child. Although stepparent adoptions may be otherwise cumber-
some,45 they are certainly legal. The raising of an illegitimate child by
his father and stepmother is well within the contemplation of the
law.46
With rare exception,4 7 adoptions cannot be made without the con-
sent of the child's mother. In many jurisdictions, including the United
Kingdom, the mother's consent is not effective until some specified
time after birth.48 The surrogate motherhood contract would not by
itself be effective consent for purposes of these laws. Thus, the natu-
ral mother could change her mind after signing the agreement but
before the statutory consent period expired. These restrictions on the
mother's consent, however, should be viewed as creating a problem of
enforcement, not a problem of legality.49 A surrogate parenting ar-
rangement in which the surrogate cooperates would not be affected by
the consent requirement. Should the mother change her mind and
oppose the adoption, the father and his wife face formidable problems
in obtaining custody of the child and completing the adoption process.
These complications will be addressed in the section outlining guide-
lines for enforcement. Here it suffices to point out that a carefully
drafted surrogacy agreement might avoid any obstacles created by the
adoption laws.
states, while allowing independent adoptions, regulate the process to some ex-
tent. W. MEEZEN, S. KATZ & E. Russo, supra note 15, at 165-75. See also Poldol-
ski, Abolishing Baby Buying: Limiting Independent Adoption Placement, 9 FAM.
L.Q. 547 (1975).
44. E.g., Adoption Act, 1976, ch. 36, §§ 11(1)(a), 72(1).
45. Id. §§ 14(3), 15(4). See generally Comment, StepparentAdoption: A Comparative
Analysis of Laws and Policies in England and the United States, 7 B.C. INT'L &
Comp. L. REv. 469 (1984).
46. Re C (M.A.) (An Infant) [1966] 1 All E.R. 838. A successful stepparent adoption is
more likely when there is no expected future contact between the child and the
nonadopting natural parent. Re D (Minors), 2 F.L.R. 102, 10 Fain. Law 246 (Ct.
App. 1980). That is the case in the typical surrogacy arrangement.
47. Adoption Act, 1976, ch. 36, § 16(2); In Re F (A Minor) [1982] All E.R. 321.
48. Adoption Act 1976, ch. 36, § 18(4) (the mother's consent is not effective unless
given six weeks after birth); KY. REV. STAT. § 199.601(2) (1984) (five day waiting
period).
49. This is the precise approach taken by the Kentucky Supreme Court. See Surro-
gate Parenting Assoc. v. Kentucky ex. rel Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209, 213 (Ky.
1986).
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2. Laws Regulating Artificial Insemination and Presumptions
of Paternity
Artificial insemination by donor (AID) is a widely accepted tech-
nique practiced in both the United States and Great Britain.5 0 The
parallels between AID and surrogate motherhood are striking. Both
techniques alleviate infertility within a marriage by allowing a party
outside the marriage to provide needed germinal material. The AID
donor supplies sperm while the surrogate mother provides an egg.
One obvious difference is the additional gestational function served by
the surrogate mother. The end result, however, is identical. With the
assistance of a third party, a couple who would otherwise be childless,
is able to bring into the world a child who is genetically related to one
of them.
Despite the long history of AID in Great Britain, no statutes specif-
ically regulate the practice. A child born through AID is illegitimate
under English law. The sperm donor, and not the mother's husband,
is vested with parental rights and obligations.51 The law in the United
States is quite different. Twenty-four states have legislation designed
to facilitate AID.52 Typically, these statutes provide that if the hus-
band consents to AID in writing, he will be presumed to be the legal
father of the child for purposes of support, inheritance and custody.53
The child is therefore legitimate. Courts in several other states have
achieved the same result without the benefit of a statute.5 4 Independ-
ent of any consideration of AID, the law in both the United States and
Great Britain presumes that any child born to a married woman is the
legitimate product of her marriage.5 5 The presumption is often de-
scribed as a strong one, but it can be rebutted in most jurisdictions by
proof of the husband's impotency, non-access or properly conducted
blood grouping tests.55
50. AID is estimated to give rise to between 2000 and 4000 births in the United King-
dom, HUMAN PROCREATION, supra note 3, at 14 (1984), and between 6000 and
10,000 births in the United States, Curie-Cohen, Luttrell & Shapiro, Current
Practice of Artificial Insemination by Donor in the United States, 300 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 585, 588 (1979). The first documented case of human artificial insemina-
tion was in England in 1790. W. FINEGOLD, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION 6 (1964).
51. WARNOCK REPORT, supra note 3, at § 4.9.
52. For citations to specific statutes, see Wadlington, Artificial Conception The Chal-
lenge of Family Law, 69 VA. L. REV. 465, 483 n.84 (1983); Andrews, supra note 18,
at 54-55.
53. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-21 (1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-129 (1980).
54. E.g., People v. Sorenson, 68 Cal.2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1968); Gursky
v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
55. Family Law Reform Act, 1969, ch. 46, § 26 (United Kingdom); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 406.011 (1980); MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 700.111(2), (3) (1980).
56. E.g., Gray v. Richardson, 474 F.2d 1370 (6th Cir. 1973); Commonweath v. Pizzi-
mente, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 668, 306 N.E.2d 279 (App. Ct. 1974). In some jurisdictions,
however, only the wife's husband has standing to challenge the presumption of
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Ironically, the presumption of paternity created by statutes and
court decisions that facilitate AID, might simultaneously frustrate a
surrogate motherhood arrangement. Agencies that negotiate surro-
gacy agreements reportedly prefer to employ married women with a
history of successful childbirth as surrogate mothers.57 These women
are thought to be most likely to bear a healthy baby and to be least
susceptible to psychological problems when giving the child to the fa-
ther and his wife. If the surrogate is married, however, the law may
presume that her husband is the father of the child. There are at least
two reported American cases in which the presumption of legitimacy
impeded the performance of a surrogacy agreement.5 8
These problems may be overcome. The surrogate in Syrkowski
was a married woman. In an effort to circumvent the statutory and
common law presumptions of paternity, the surrogate's husband
signed an affidavit of non-consent to the artificial insemination. The
absence of the husband's consent nullified the presumption of pater-
nity created by the AID statute. 59 The common law presumption of
legitimacy could then be rebutted through the use of blood tests.6 0
Syrkowski illustrates the absurdity of regulating surrogacy arrange-
ments under laws designed to achieve different purposes. The surro-
gate's husband actually cooperated in the arrangement by falsely
denying his consent. Such machinations can hardly foster respect for
the law.6 '
legitimacy. E.g., Taylor v. Taylor, 295 So.2d 494 (La. Ct. App. 1974); A v. X, 641
P.2d 1222 (Wyo. 1982). In these jurisdictions, the commissioning couple would
have no recourse if the surrogate and her husband decided to keep the child.
57. Brophy, supra note 8, at 265; Wadlington, supra note 52, at 476.
58. In re a Baby Girl, 9 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2348 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Mar. 8, 1983) (pre-
sumption of legitimacy prevents surrogate mother from terminating her parental
rights in order to facilitate commissioning couple's efforts to obtain custody and
adopt a child); In re R.K.S., 10 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 1383 (D.C. Sup. Ct. April 13,
1983) (court refused to expedite adoption process because a child is presumed to
be that of the surrogate mother's husband).
59. Syrkowski v. Appleyard, 420 Mich. 367, 371-72, 362 N.W.2d 211, 213 (1985).
60. The Human Leukocyte Antigen (HLA) tissue typing test has been held admissi-
ble evidence to help prove or disprove paternity. E.g., Crain v. Crain, 104 Idaho
666, 662 P.2d 538 (1983). See Terasaki, Resolution by HLA Testing of 100 Pater-
nity Cases Not Excluded by ABO Testing, 16 J. FAM. L. 543 (1978).
61. A constitutional challenge to the application of statutory presumptions of pater-
nity to surrogacy arrangements was deflected in Sherwyn & Handel v. Depart-
ment of Social Services, 173 Cal. App. 3d 52, 218 Cal. Rptr. 778 (Cal. Ct. App.
1985). The plaintiffs in the action were lawyers that represented over 100 couples
involved in surrogate parenting arrangements. The various constitutional attacks
on the statutes were predicated primarily on Professor Robertson's theory of a
constitutional right of procreative liberty. Sherwyn & Handel v. Department of
Social Services, 173 Cal. App. 3d 52,-, 218 Cal. Rptr. 778,782 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
See also supra note 28. The court ruled that the attorneys had no standing to
bring such an action. Sherwyn & Handel v. Department of Social Services, 173
Cal. App. 3d 52, -, 218 Cal. Rptr. 778, 782 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). Although the
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3. Public Policy
Surrogacy agreements could be declared illegal and contrary to
"public policy" even if they did not violate a specific statute. The War-
nock Committee had "little doubt" that surrogacy agreements contra-
vened public policy.62 Presumably, the policy implicated by surrogacy
agreements is the same policy that underlies statutes prohibiting the
buying and selling of babies generally: a concern that the welfare of
the child will not be protected, that surrogate mothers will be ex-
ploited and that human dignity is denigrated by recognizing any agree-
ment in which a child is produced for money.63
There is more authority suggesting that surrogacy agreements vio-
late public policy in the United Kingdom than in the United States. In
Great Britain it is commonly said that any contract purporting to
transfer parental rights is against public policy.64 The limited case law
that exists suggests that surrogacy agreements are unenforceable, at
least insofar as custody of the child is concerned. In Humphreys v.
Polak,65 the court refused to enforce an agreement by which the
mother of an illegitimate child was to give her child to a couple for a
one month "trial." More directly on point is the case of A v. C,66 in
which the court held that the surrogacy contract between an unmar-
ried man and a prostitute contravened public policy. Thus, the War-
nock Committee's belief that surrogacy agreements are unenforceable
has support.
The law in the United States on this point is less clear. A contrac-
tual agreement affecting custody of a child is not specifically enforcea-
ble per se. It may be enforced, however, if the agreement is consistent
with the best interests of the child.67 American courts, for example,
have upheld agreements in which mothers consented to their chil-
dren's adoption in consideration for being named in the adoptive par-
Court did not reach the merits of the case, it did express "grave doubts" as to
whether the statutes had any application to surrogate parenting arrangements.
Id. at -, 218 Cal. Reptr. at 783.
62. WARNOCK REPORT, supra note 3, at § 8.5.
63. See Cohen, supra note 8, at 253-55; Holder, Surrogate Motherhood Babies for
Fun and Profit, 12 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE, June, 1984, at 115; Krimmel, The
Case Against Surrogate Parenting, HAST. CENTER REP., Oct., 1983, at 35; Sap-
pideen, supra note 8, at 101-02.
64. 1 J. CHITTY, CHITTY ON CONTRACTS 1091 (25th ed. 1982); G. TREITEL, THE LAW
OF CONTRACT 332 (1983). Such agreements would appear to violate § 85(2) of the
Children Act 1975. That provision reads: "Subject to section 1(2) of the Guardi-
anship Act 1973 [which relates to separation agreements between husband and
wife] a person cannot surrender or transfer to another any parental right or duty
he has as respects a child." This statute does not apply in Scotland.
65. [1901] 2 K.B. 385.
66. [1978] 8 Fain. 170.
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 191 (1979); E. FARNSWORTH, CON-
TRACTS § 5.4 (1982).
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ent's will.6 8 These adoptions were independently determined to be in
the best interests of the children. The recent Kentucky decision in
Surrogate Parenting Associates and, to a lesser extent, the Michigan
decision refusing to rule that surrogacy agreements violate public pol-
icy in Syrkowski suggest that the public policy issue must be consid-
ered an open question in the United States. 69
In light of sparse and conflicting authority and varying perceptions
of policy, one cannot be sure whether surrogacy agreements violate
public policy, adoption laws or any other law. The current legal status
of surrogacy agreements can only be described as uncertain. To say
that the law is uncertain is to invite legislative clarification. The next
section examines various statutory proposals that specifically address
surrogate motherhood.
III. COMPREHENSIVE LEGISLATION: AMERICAN,
CANADIAN, BRITISH, AND AUSTRALIAN
PROPOSALS
A. United States
Surrogate parenting in the United States is currently governed by
the patchwork of adoption and artificial insemination laws discussed
above. While no comprehensive statutory scheme has been enacted,
legislation has been introduced in twenty-two states and the Study
Committee for the Uniform Adoption Act is considering the issue.7 0
Most of the proposed legislation would legalize and regulate surrogate
motherhood practices. 71 These bills range in complexity from a blan-
ket authorization of surrogacy arrangements to a detailed regulation
of the entire process. The more common provisions would
(i) establish the qualifications for prospective surrogate mothers and
the circumstances under which the process can be used, (ii) require
documentation of consent of all parties and their spouses, (iii) declare
the child to be the legitimate offspring of the father and his wife, and
(iv) establish the custody, support rights, and obligations of the surro-
68. E.g., Reimche v. First Nat'l Bank, 512 F.2d 187, 189 (9th Cir. 1975); In re Estate of
Shirk, 186 Kan. 311, 324, 350 P.2d 1, 12 (1960).
69. See supra notes 26-41 and accompanying text.
70. For a summary of these proposals, see Pierce, Survey of State Activity Regarding
Surrogate Motherhood, 11 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 3001 (Jan. 29, 1985). A collection
of proposed statutes can be found in HUM. REPRODUCTION & L. REP., Report No.
13, Jan.-Feb. 1984, at 71-108. Recently, a study committee began work on drafting
a Uniform Adoption Act that would clarify the legal status of children born as a
result of artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization, embryo transfer and surro-
gate motherhood. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, Report of the Study Committee on Uniform Adoption Act (1985).
71. Four of the proposed bills would prohibit surrogate motherhood. The others
would approve of and regulate the practice to some extent. See Pierce, supra note
70.
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gate mother (and her husband) and the natural father (and his wife). 72
These proposed statutes would streamline the process by eliminating
the need to institute separate custody, termination of parental rights,
and adoption proceedings as would likely be required without such
legislation. In this respect the proposals mirror the model established
by legislation dealing with artificial insemination.
B. Canada
The Ontario Law Reform Commission considered surrogate moth-
erhood in its recently issued and far reaching report on technologies
for human reproduction.73 The Commission found that assorted stat-
utes dealing with adoption, child welfare, and paternity created sub-
stantial, but not insurmountable, barriers to effectuating a surrogacy
agreement. 74 It rejected arguments that surrogate motherhood was
immoral and found it to be an ethically acceptable response to the
problems of infertility.75 Accordingly the report recommended the
enactment of comprehensive legislation designed to legitimize, facili-
tate, and regulate surrogate parenting practices.
The proposed legislation would resolve the range of family law is-
sues presented by surrogacy arrangements.76 The dangers of commer-
cialism and exploitation would be controlled through a regulatory
scheme requiring judicial approval of the agreement itself. The court
would review the agreement to ensure that it clearly addresses various
legislatively mandated subjects such as prenatal restrictions on the
surrogate's conduct and surrender of custody.77 The agreement must
also provide for unanticipated contingencies, such as the death of the
commissioning couple before birth.78 Furthermore, no payment could
be made to the surrogate without the approval of the court.79 Finally,
72. M at 3003-04. Pre-insemination medical and psychological screening would be
required of the surrogate. Termination of the surrogate's parental rights would
be triggered by establishing the sperm donor's paternity through HLA tests. Id&
73. ONTARIO REPORT, supra note 3.
74. H, vol. I, at 94-102.
75. H, vol. II, at 229-33.
76. Upon the birth of the child, custody would be given to the judicially approved
social parents who would be recognized as full legal parents for all purposes. The
surrogate would have no legal relationship to the child and the child would be the
legitimate offspring of the social parents for all purposes including inheritance.
Id. at 260-61.
77. IH- at 249-60.
78. I& at 259.
79. Id. at 253-55. While the Report authorizes judicial approval of fees paid to the
surrogate, the Commission was divided on which items of payment should be per-
mitted by the legislation and the degree of discretion to be given the court. Id at
254. Unable to reach a consensus on this matter, the Commission's recommenda-
tion would effectively delegate complete discretion to the courts to police the fi-
nancial aspects of the transaction.
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private agencies would be subject to direct regulation by the Mfinistry
of Community and Social Services.8 0 The Ontario Report is remarka-
bly thorough and may well serve as the basis for comprehensive legis-
lation in this area.
C. United Kingdom
1. The Warnock Report
The Warnock Committee also examined a wide range of procrea-
tional relationships. It gave its blessings to in vitro fertilization, artifi-
cial insemination, egg donation, and to a more limited extent, embryo
donation. It recommended that each of these practices be regulated by
a new statutory licensing authority.8 ' This authority would gather
empirical data, issue guidelines for good practices, and guard against
potential abuses.
Surrogate parenting was the only reproductive alternative to re-
ceive outright condemnation. A majority of the committee was con-
cerned about the dangers of commercial exploitation. Voiced in
utilitarian terms, the committee was convinced that "the danger of ex-
ploitation of one human being by another appears.., far to outweigh
the potential benefit .... ,,82 All surrogacy agreements, furthermore,
"treat others as a means to their own ends" and are therefore morally
objectionable, '"however desirable the consequences."8 3 Accordingly, a
majority of the Committee recommended the criminalization of com-
mercial surrogacy agencies and an express statutory declaration that
all surrogacy agreements are illegal contracts.8 4
Two members of the Committee dissented from this portion of the
Report. While they shared the majority's concern about commercial
agencies, they disagreed as to the proper response. The dissenters
would utilize the proposed licensing authority as a safeguard against
abuse.85 They propose that the licensing authority permit surrogacy
arrangements only where surrogacy is necessary to alleviate
infertility.8 6
2. The Surrogacy Arrangements Act
In July of 1985, Parliament passed the government sponsored Sur-
80. Id at 261-62.
81. WARNOCK REPORT, supra note 3, at § 13.3. The proposed authority would be in-
dependent of government, health authorities and research institutions. Great
emphasis is placed on lay representation Id.
82. Id. at § 8.17.
83. Id.
84. Id- at §§ 8.18, 8.19.
85. Id at 87-88 (dissenting views of Greengross and Davies).
86. Id. at 88.
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rogacy Arrangements Act.87 The Act is designed to implement par-
tially the recommendations of the Warnock Committee. The thrust of
the legislation is to make criminal the operation of a commercial sur-
rogacy agency. It is not directed at surrogate motherhood itself, only
those commercial brokers who would arrange those transactions. In
this respect the legislation is faithful to the Warnock Report. The Act
does not, however, implement the Committee's additional recommen-
dation that all surrogacy agreements be declared illegal.
The basic features of the Surrogacy Arrangements Act are
straightforward. It defines surrogate mother to include women who
become pregnant by means of embryo transfer as well as by artificial
insemination.88 Thus, the law makes no distinctions between surro-
gate mothers who are genetically related to the child and those who
are not. Section 2 criminalizes the making, negotiating or facilitating
of any surrogacy arrangement for any payment. The commissioning
couple and the surrogate mother, however, are exempted from this
provision.8 9 Only third parties who facilitate surrogacy arrangements
for a fee are potential defendants. Section 3 makes it an offense for
anyone, including the commissioning couple and the surrogate, to ad-
vertise the need for or availability of surrogacy services. Newspapers
and broadcast media also commit an offense if they publish or dis-
tribute advertising of or for surrogacy services.9 0
It is important to note what the Act does not do. It is not an of-
fense for the commissioning couple and the surrogate mother to di-
rectly negotiate a surrogacy agreement. Agents can be used so long as
they do not receive any payment.91 The Act also does not prohibit the
commissioning couple from paying a fee to the surrogate mother.9 2
The legislation is limited to outlawing commercial intermediaries and
prohibiting advertising for surrogacy services.
The limited scope of the Act fails to resolve many legal issues sur-
rounding surrogacy arrangements and creates some new ones. The
statute is remarkably ambivalent as to the legal status of the surro-
gacy agreements themselves. Section 1(9) declares that the Act gov-
erns arrangements "whether or not they are lawful and whether or
not they are enforceable." 93 Thus, the Act does not expressly declare
all surrogacy arrangements illegal. Given this equivocation and be-
cause the conditions that move couples to seek surrogacy services re-
main, it is probable that surrogate parenting will continue to occur at
87. Surrogacy Arrangements Act, 1985, supra note 5.
88. Id. at § 1(6).
89. Id- at § 2(2).
90. I& at §§ 3(2)-3(3).
91. Id. at § 2(3).
92. Id at §§ 2(2)(b) & 3.
93. Id. at § 1(9).
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some level. Yet the Act is completely silent regarding many critical
issues that are likely to arise. There is, for example, no provision ad-
dressing the issue of legitimacy. The Warnock Report recommended
that a child born through AID be considered the legitimate offspring
of his mother and her husband.94 Should not the child born through a
surrogacy arrangement be treated as the legitimate child of his father
and his wife? What are the respective rights and obligations of the
commissioning couple and surrogate mother regarding custody, access
and support? Traditionally, the mother of an illegitimate child was
vested with parental rights.95 Should surrogate motherhood be
treated as any other case of illegitimacy or should the parties' intent
help define their respective rights and obligations?
The Act also does not address the potentially conflicting interests
of the surrogate mother and child with regard to confidentiality. At
some future point, the child may wish to learn the identity of her sur-
rogate mother while the surrogate may desire to remain anonymous.
The Warnock Report recommends that AID sperm donors receive
complete anonymity although the child may have access to basic infor-
mation about the donor's ethnic background and genetic health.96 The
Children Act, on the other hand, authorizes an adopted child of eight-
een years of age to obtain a certified copy of his or her original birth
certificate, which presumably identifies the child's mother.97 Which
model of confidentiality should apply to surrogate parenting?
Perhaps these questions could be ignored by assuming that all sur-
rogacy arrangements are illegal and therefore people will not engage
in such practices. As noted above, there is some support for the argu-
ment that public policy is offended by surrogacy agreements. But the
Act itself, by consciously declining to prohibit all surrogacy agree-
ments, may call this into question. The Act goes to great length to
exclude commissioning couples and surrogate mothers from some of
its prohibitions. By targeting only commercial intermediaries in spite
of the broader condemnation of the Warnock Committee, the Act sug-
gests an acceptance of surrogate parenting in non-commercial con-
texts. Furthermore, the recommendations of the Ontario Report and
the unwillingness of several American courts to invalidate surrogacy
agreements illustrate that reasonable minds can differ as to which pol-
icy is in the public's interest. At the very least, whether all surrogate
parenting agreements contravene public policy is an open question.
There is also a logical inconsistency between the objectives and
94. WARNOCK REPORT, supra note 3.
95. Children Act, supra note 16, at § 85(7). The father of an illegitimate child may
apply for custody of or access to his child under the Guardianship of Minors Act,
1971, ch. 3, § 9.
96. WARNOCK REPORT, supra note 3, at § 4.21.
97. Children Act, supra note 16, at § 26(2).
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methods of the Surrogacy Arrangements Act. The Act clearly pur-
ports to combat the perceived evils of commercialism. Yet there is no
prohibition against the commissioning couple paying a surrogate a sub-
stantial fee for her services. Directly negotiated agreements have oc-
curred in the past.98 It is difficult to see how a fee is any less
commercial, coercive or exploitative if offered directly by the commis-
sioning couple rather than by the couple's commercial agent.
Perhaps the most serious danger posed by this piecemeal legisla-
tion is its encouragement of amateurish agreements. The Act defines
the criminal offense in terms of "making, or negotiating or facilitating
the making of, any surrogacy agreement."9 9 This definition is suffi-
ciently broad to include legal, medical, and psychological counselors
who, for a fee, might otherwise assist the parties. The couple and the
surrogate are left to stumble through the process without the advice of
experts. It is most unfortunate that a law which does not condemn the
agreement itself does not permit the parties to pursue an agreement in
a professional manner.
D. Australia
Victoria, Australia has recently adopted legislation that criminal-
izes most surrogacy practices. The Infertility (Medical Procedures)
Act100 makes it an offense to give or receive payment pursuant to a
surrogacy agreement. It also proscribes advertising the need for or
availability of surrogacy services. Both the commissioning couple and
the surrogate may be prosecuted under these provisions. The only
surrogacy arrangement not subject to criminal penalty is one in which
no fee is paid. Even this arrangement, however, is declared void and
unenforceable. The practical effect of the legislation is an outright
ban on all surrogacy practices.
The Victorian Act is much neater than its British counterpart.
Under the Victorian law, there is no exclusion of the parties from
criminal penalties and no lingering uncertainty as to the enforceabil-
ity of agreements that invites dangerous uncounseled negotiations.
The Australian statute thus meets most of the criticisms leveled at the
British law. Yet, this is not the preferred solution. The following sec-
tion endeavors to demonstrate that surrogacy arrangements are not
98. See, e.g., A v. C [1978] 8 Faro. 170 where the father directly solicited a prostitute
for surrogacy services. The first woman he approached declined the offer but put
him in contact with another woman who agreed to bear his child.
99. Surrogacy Arrangements Act, 1985, supra note 87, at § 2(3)(b).
100. The Victorian legislation is not limited to surrogate motherhood but addresses a
number of procreational techniques, including artificial insemination and in vitro
fertilization. The Act is regulatory in nature, setting forth who may perform
these procedures and the circumstances under which they may be carried out.
For an analysis of the legislation, see Corns, Legal Regulation of In Vitro Fertili-
zation in Victoria, 58 LAW INST. J. 838 (1984).
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inherently unethical or immoral. Without some stronger showing of
the dangers of surrogacy arrangements, individuals in a free society
should be allowed to choose this procreational option.
IV. THE ETHICS OF SURROGATE PARENTING
The United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and the United States
share a strong commitment toward preserving individual liberty. Lib-
erty is valued as a good in itself as well as for the good it produces. In
societies that value liberty, individuals are generally free to act with-
out government restriction. Societal commitment to individual liberty
is reflected in various legal doctrines such as freedom of contract,1 01
informed consent,10 2 and the right of some patients to refuse un-
wanted medical treatment.1 03 Of course, freedom to act is not abso-
lute. State restrictions on liberty frequently are imposed when the
conduct threatens to injure a third party. Intervention is sometimes
justified in paternalistic terms to protect individuals from their own
folly. Limited paternalism is acceptable, however, only where the pre-
vention of the threatened harm clearly outweighs the resulting loss of
liberty or when the individual is unable to act autonomously.04 For
fear that these exceptions may swallow the rule, a heavy burden must
be met to justify intervention.
Opponents of surrogate parenting offer two types of arguments to
justify prohibiting the practice. The first may be characterized as con-
sequentialist. That is, opponents maintain that if allowed, surrogate
parenting would produce certain undesirable consequences. Conse-
quentialist arguments are basically utilitarian in nature and require an
assessment of the relative risks and benefits of the practice. The sec-
101. 1 J. CMrrrY, supra note 64, at 4; E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 67, at 21-22.
102. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Sidaway v. Bethlem Royal
Hosp. Governors [1985] 1 All E.R. 643. Sidaway and Canterbury agree that a doc-
tor owes a duty to a patient to provide information concerning the risks of pro-
posed treatment. This duty rests on autonomy values that give the patient the
ultimate authority to refuse or accept treatment. The cases differ with regard to
the standard of care. Canterbury defines the duty to disclose information in
terms of risks material to a prudent patient. Sidaway approves a standard that,
in most instances, is tied to the disclosure practices of other physicians. See
Brahams, The Sidaway Case: Informed Consent-The Thin End of the Wedge, 135
NEW L.J. 201 (1985). This difference should not obscure the common commit-
ment to patient autonomy.
103. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), In Re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C.
1972). See Meulders-Klein, The Right Over One's Own Body: Its Scope and Lim-
its in Comparative Law, 6 B.C. INT'L & COmP. L. REv. 27 (1983).
104. Acceptance of paternalistic interference with liberty under these circumstances is
justified as a form of "social insurance" that fully rational people would take out
to protect themselves. T. BEAucHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDI-
CAL ETmcs 172 (1983) (citing DWORKjN, Paternalism, 56 MoNIST 64 (1972)); J.
RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 248-49 (1971).
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ond type of objection is nonconsequentialist in that it finds surrogacy
arrangements morally unacceptable regardless of their beneficial im-
pact.105 The Warnock Committee, in a conclusory fashion, relied on
both types of arguments to support its recommendations. A closer ex-
amination of the interests of all concerned, however, reveals that
neither type of argument justifies interference with the liberty of the
parties to enter into and perform their obligations under a surrogacy
agreement.
A. Consequentialist Objections to Surrogate Motherhood
1. Potential Harm to the Child
The interest of the child is the most important consideration in
evaluating the ethics of surrogate parenting. The child is not a party
to the agreement but is profoundly affected by it. Unable to protect
his own interests, the child must look to others for protection. From
the child's perspective, the benefits of surrogate motherhood clearly
outweigh any potential harms. In the first place, surrogate mother-
hood, as commonly practiced, poses no greater physical risk to the
child than those risks presented by an ordinary pregnancy. In terms
of physiological development, surrogate motherhood is only a varia-
tion of AID. AID has long been considered to present an ethically
acceptable level of risk.106
Psychological risks to the child must be considered as well. Most of
the purported dangers stem from the separation of genetic and gesta-
tional parenting from social parenting. The concern is that the child
may suffer from a feeling of genetic rootlessness when he learns of his
origins.107 This feeling may be aggravated by the knowledge that his
genetic and gestational mother purposefully conceived him for money
with the clear intention of "giving him away." The most serious
threat of psychological trauma is the possibility that both the surro-
gate mother and commissioning couple would reject the child. This
occurred in a highly publicized American case. 108
105. The consequentialist-nonconsequentialist dichotomy is borrowed from J. SMART
& B. WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 82-93 (1973).
106. Present data suggests that AID children suffer no greater incidence of neonatal
mortality, congenital defect, or difficulty in physical or mental development than
children who have been conceived normally. McLaren, Biological Aspects of
AID, in C.I.B.A. FOUNDATION, LAW AND ETHICS OF AID AND EMBRYO TRANSFER 5
(1973). See also HUMAN PROCREATION, supra note 3, at 15. There are alarming
recent reports, however, that acquired immune deficiency syndrome may be
transmitted by artificial insemination. Wright, U.S. Sperm Banks Screening Do-
nors for AIDS, Atlanta Constitution, Aug. 23, 1985, at 10, col. 3.
107. Kass, Making Babies-The New Biology and the Old Morality, 26 PUB. INTEREST
18 (1972); Kass, Making Babies Revisited, 39 PUB. INTEREST 54 (1979); Sappideen,
supra note 7, at 101-02.
108. In January of 1983, a surrogate mother named Judy Stiver gave birth to a child
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While not denying that these problems could occur, one must place
them in perspective. Separation of genetic and social parenting occurs
frequently in today's society. Adoption, AID, divorce and blended
families each involve some division of the traditional parenting func-
tion. The same type of psychological risks posed by surrogacy is pres-
ent in these contexts.109 That surrogate parenting involves planned
conduct does not fundamentally alter the nature of the risk. Further-
more, there is nothing inherent in the surrogacy arrangement that
heightens the tragedy of the unwanted impaired newborn. Surrogate
motherhood does not cause birth defects. It is the impaired condition,
not the circumstances of conception, that creates the problems. The
American experience with handicapped newborns suggests that the
ethics of withholding treatment is equally troubling in traditional
childbirth.11o
One must consider the benefits that surrogacy arrangements bring
to the child.111 Without the surrogacy arrangement, that particular
child would never have come into existence. Surely existence with
some psychological risk is infinitely preferable to never having been
born. The rejection of so-called wrongful life tort claims by English
inflicted with a disorder indicating mental retardation. The contracting father,
Alexander Malahoff, disclaimed paternity and refused to accept responsibility for
the child's care. The hospital obtained a court order authorizing medical treat-
ment. Mrs. Stivers, her husband, and Mr. Malahoff underwent blood and tissue
tests to establish the child's paternity. The parties appeared on television and the
test results were announced during the "Phil Donahue Show." The tests con-
firmed that Mr. Stivers was the father of the child. Mr. Malahoff has sued Mrs.
Stivers for breach of contract. The Stivers also sued Mr. Malahoff for invasion of
privacy by making the whole affair public and now claim that the child's condi-
tion was caused by a virus transmitted by Malahoff's sperm. See Andrews, supra
note 18, at 56.
109. Robertson, Surrogate Mothers: Not So Novel After All, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Oct., 1983, at 28, 30-31.
110. The withholding of medical treatment to impaired newborns is the subject of in-
tense controversy in the United States. Throughout the debates there has been
no suggestion that children conceived by artificial insemination are denied treat-
ment more often than other children. Indeed, the most prominent cases involve
traditional procreational patterns. Much of the present legislative activity was
prompted by an incident where the parents of a Downs Syndrome child refused
to authorize surgery necessary to correct problems with the child's esophagus.
The Indiana Supreme Court did not override the parents' decision and the child
died six days later. Babish & Russell, The Demise of Infant Doe, Washington
Post, Apr. 17, 1982, at A1, col. 5. The federal government responded with pro-
posed regulations designed to guarantee that handicapped newborns were not de-
prived of treatment. After several revisions, regulations were enacted. See 49
Fed. Reg. 1621 (1984). For a discussion of these issues see, Symposium, Baby Doe:
Problems and Legislative Proposals- Legislative Workshop, 1984 ARiz. ST. L.J.
601.
111. The production of benefit is a cornerstone of modern biomedical ethics. T.
BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, supra note 104, at 148.
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and a majority of American courts112 reflects a policy of cherishing
life, a policy that is advanced by surrogate motherhood. The trouble
and expense incurred by the commissioning couple additionally sug-
gests that the child will be raised by parents who dearly want him.
The case for prohibiting surrogate parenting in order to protect the
interests of the child is not convincing. The potential psychological
risks are not peculiar to surrogacy arrangements. They are quite com-
parable to those already encountered in other sanctioned reproductive
and familial contexts. More importantly, these risks appear insignifi-
cant when compared to the benefits surrogacy affords the child. Life,
even if accompanied by a certain genetic rootlessness, surely out-
weighs the alternative of nonexistence. From the child's perspective,
surrogate motherhood cannot be considered unethical.
2. Potential Harm to the Parties
Even if surrogacy arrangements do not pose an unreasonable de-
gree of risk to the child, society must consider their effect on the par-
ties. Here we enter the murky realm of limited paternalism. State
intervention is warranted only if the agreement clearly creates an un-
acceptable level of risk to one or both of the parties, or if the parties
are incapable of rationally assessing their own best interests.
a. The Interests of the Commissioning Couple
Surrogate parenting, of course, poses no physical risks to the com-
missioning couple. It does, however, involve a sizeable psychological
and monetary investment. Should the transaction not be completed,
for whatever reasons, the couple may suffer an economic loss and
profound emotional distress. These dangers are arguably magnified
by the involvement of commercial agencies who could prey on the vul-
nerability of desperate couples desiring children. These in-
termediaries are likely to increase the couple's monetary investment
and could mislead the couple by understating the risk that they may
not receive a child.
The parties to any agreement are exposed to the risk of disappoint-
ment. The psychological and economic risks peculiar to surrogacy
agreements are known to the couple in advance. Those who facilitate
surrogate parenting arrangements are reported to advise their clients
that the surrogate mother could change her mind and keep the
child.113 The danger of disappointment in surrogate motherhood is
112. McKay v. Essex Area Health Auth., [1982] 2 All E.R. 771; Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho
253, 698 P.2d 315 (1984); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979). A minor-
ity of three states allow the wrongful life action by the child. E.g., Turpin v. Sor-
tini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982).
113. Brophy, supra note 8, at 264.
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similar to that which already exists with regard to adoption. There
too, the mother often may legally rescind her consent within a speci-
fied time after birth.
The danger of potential exploitation can be addressed in several
ways. We must first recognize that this risk exists in many facets of
life. There are all too many instances of attorneys defrauding their
clients and doctors abusing their patients. Society does not respond to
these abuses by prohibiting the practice of law or medicine, but by
attempting to police the particular exploitative conduct. Because both
doctors and lawyers are integral participants in surrogacy arrange-
ments, the disciplinary mechanisms of both professions would apply.
Civil and criminal consumer protection laws would also guard against
overreaching by commercial agencies. Should these existing protec-
tions be deemed insufficient, specific regulation is possible. The Cana-
dian proposal calling for judicial review of surrogacy agreements is but
one example. The licensing model of regulation proposed by the War-
nock Committee for other reproductive activities could be easily ap-
plied to surrogacy agencies. The licensing authority could be expected
to provide an accurate assessment of the potential personal and legal
complications of surrogate parenting.
The point here is that the paternalistic justification for prohibiting
surrogate parenting is not particularly strong when measured against
the interests of the commissioning couple. They are likely to be aware
of the risks but perceive it to be in their best interests to accept those
risks. Abuses can be dealt with by either current laws or additional
regulation.
b. The Interests of the Surrogate Mother
Surrogacy arrangements present several risks to the surrogate
mother. She is exposed to the inconvenience of the insemination pro-
cess as well as the physical risks and discomforts associated with preg-
nancy and childbirth. These dangers, however, are not sufficient to
warrant prohibiting surrogate motherhood. They are well known and
willingly accepted by many women and permitted by society in other
contexts. Just as the state does not deem it necessary to protect wo-
men from the physical dangers of pregnancy in other settings, the
physical risks alone cannot justify a ban on surrogacy arrangements.
The real concern is the perceived psychological trauma associated
with relinquishing the child to its father. Although very little is
known about the subject of bonding, there is an intuitive conviction
that carrying and delivering a child creates a unique bond between
mother and child.114 The breaking of that bond is feared to cause se-
114. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF PREGNANCY, BmRn-NG & BONDING 21 (B. Blum ed.
1980); G. DIcK-READ, CHILDBIRTH WITHouT FEAR 10-15 (5th ed. 1984).
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vere emotional trauma to the mother and child. The reported cases of
refusals to surrender custody suggest that some surrogate mothers do
underestimate their attachment to their children.
Again, it must be emphasized that the surrogate mother is aware of
this risk. Most surrogate mothers have given birth before 115 and must
be presumed to understand what might be involved in relinquishing
the child to its father. The state frequently sanctions a mother's con-
scious decision to sever her bonds with her child in connection with
divorce and adoption. These decisions are generally scrutinized only
to determine whether they are voluntary and in the child's best inter-
est. The potential psychological harm to the mother, if considered at
all, is done on a case by case basis.
The conditions giving rise to most surrogacy arrangements would
seem less coercive than those attending many adoptions. In the stere-
otypical adoption, a young unwed woman finds herself pregnant but
financially or emotionally unable to care for a child. The pregnancy
creates an immediacy that could cloud her judgment. The potential
surrogate mother does not act under this type of pressure. She has
time to reflect upon the implications of the proposed undertaking
before becoming pregnant.116
Many express concern about the potential coercive effect of the
fee. It is feared that economic conditions might "force" a woman to
become a surrogate mother who otherwise would not want to. Prelim-
inary research reveals that financial considerations are an important,
though not an exclusive, factor motivating women to volunteer to be-
come surrogate mothers.117 The fee is clearly an inducement, but is it
coercive?
On one level, money influences many decisions an individual
makes. Payment of a fee does not alter the voluntary nature of con-
sent in most transactions. Indeed, the promise of payment is usually
indispensable to the making of any enforceable agreement. Yet there
are times when financial inducement may amount to coercion. Pay-
ments to prisoners who participate in risky medical research is criti-
cized on this basis.lls Similar concerns underlie proposed and existing
115. Parker, Motivation of Surrogate Mothers: Initial Findings, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIA-
TRY 117, 118 (1983) (Of the 125 women applying for surrogate motherhood who
were interviewed, 114 (91%) had at least one previous pregnancy and 101 (81%)
had at least one previous live birth).
116. Surrogate Parenting Assoc. v. Kentucky ex. rel Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d at 209,
211-12 (Ky. 1986).
117. Parker, supra note 115, at 118. Eighty-nine percent of the women interviewed
said a fee was a necessary condition for their participation. None of the women
stated that the fee alone was a sufficient reason for becoming a surrogate mother.
The financial inducement was often complemented by therapeutic or altruistic
motivations.
118. G. ANNAS, L. GLANTZ & B. KATZ, INFORMED CONSENT TO HUMAN EXPERIMENTA-
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prohibitions on the sale of vital organs for transplantation.119 On the
other hand, payment to sperm donors is common practice120 and no
one argues that they are exploited.
The line dividing legitimate inducement from intolerable coercion
is necessarily imprecise. One proposed test focuses on what has been
called "the moral subsistence level."' 2 ' The moral subsistence level
refers to a condition of life we as a society believe each member is
entitled to as a matter of moral decency.12 2 This condition may in-
clude basic religious and political freedoms as well as material consid-
erations such as food and shelter. When the reward offered is
necessary to raise a person to this minimally acceptable level of exist-
ence, however defined, her consent may not be truly voluntary. If she
has already attained the moral subsistence level, then the promise of
financial reward alone does not invalidate consent. Thus, a payment
promised a starving person could be considered coercive. The same
offer made to a person wanting a second automobile would be morally
acceptable.
Clinical research suggests that the average potential surrogate
mother lives above the moral subsistence level. Dr. Phillip Parker
gathered demographic and motivational data on 125 women who vol-
unteered to become surrogate mothers.123 Ninety-one percent of
them had at least one prior pregnancy and eighty-one percent had at
least one prior live birth. Most of the applicants had completed their
secondary education and many had attended universities. More than
sixty percent of them were employed. They had family incomes rang-
ing from $6,000 to $55,000. While the financial inducement was impor-
tant, it was never a totally sufficient reason for becoming a surrogate
mother. Many women expressed the strong altruistic desire to give a
baby to a parent who needed a child. Others felt that surrogate moth-
TION: THE SUBJECT'S DILE mA 113-15 (1977). The federal government has issued
regulations restricting the inducements offered prisoners to obtain their consent
to participate in biomedical and behavioral research. 28 C.F.R. § 512.16 (1984); 45
C.F.R. § 46.305(a)(2) (1984).
119. Annas, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Organ Sales, 14 HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Feb., 1984, at 22, 23; Dickens, Control of Living Body Materials, 27 U. TORONTO
L.J. 142, 165 (1977).
120. HUmAN PROCREATION, supra note 3, at § 4.5; Currie-Cohen Luttrell & Shapiro,
supra note 50, at 585.
121. Freedman, A Moral Theory of Informed Consent, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Aug.,
1975, at 32, 36. See also G. ANNAS, L. GLANTz & B. KATZ, supra note 118, at 114-
15.
122. Professor Freedman explains that "[w]e would all, no doubt, draw up different
lists of these rights and freedoms; but included in them would be safety of the
person, freedom of conscience and religion, a right to a certain level of education,
and, for some of us, a right to some level of health care." Freedman, supra note
121, at 36.
123. Parker, supra note 115. See also Franks, Psychiatric Evaluation of Women in a
Surrogate Mother Program, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1378 (1981).
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erhood would help them master unresolved feelings they had about
prior pregnancies. Dr. Parker's research indicates that the average po-
tential surrogate mother is a middle class woman who by experience
and education can be expected to understand the physical and emo-
tional risks of surrogate motherhood. The average potential surrogate
mother does not appear to be so economically desperate that the
promise of financial reward would coerce her into doing something
she did not want to do.
It is not necessary to deny the potential for exploitation, however,
to justify surrogate motherhood. Again, either the Canadian model of
judicial regulation or the licensing authority recommended by the
Warnock Committee could serve as a protection against abuse. Either
could ensure that fees are set at a level adequate to compensate the
surrogate for her time, inconvenience and risk, but not so high as to be
coercive. Legal, medical and psychological counselors could apprise
the surrogate of the attending risks so that her consent would be truly
informed. Psychological testing and counseling is reportedly routinely
performed by commercial agencies1 24 and would be required under
several American regulatory proposals.12 5
The point here is that paternalistic concerns to protect the surro-
gate from her perceived folly do not warrant a total prohibition of sur-
rogate parenting. The potential risks are obvious to the parties and
therefore call into question the need for any regulation at all. How-
ever, to the extent one views the surrogate as ripe for exploitation,
regulation short of prohibition is feasible.
3. Potential Harm to Society
Those opposed to surrogate motherhood argue that the practice
poses a threat to society at large, independent of any risk to the par-
ticipants. The argument here echoes the "public policy" considera-
tions discussed earlier. It is maintained that surrogate parenting will
damage the traditional family structure that is the foundation of our
social order. The intrusion of a third party into the reproductive pro-
cess will weaken the bonds between family members and thereby re-
duce the cohesion of the family unit.126
This concern is easily dispatched. The involvement of third parties
in procreation and child rearing is an established fact in our society.
Any threat to the family presented by the third party involvement in
124. Brophy, supra note 8, at 275-76. The women interviewed in Dr. Parker's study
were referred to him by an attorney who was actively negotiating surrogacy
agreements. Parker, supra note 115, at 117. Some reports indicate that psycho-
logical counseling is perfunctory at best. Ince, Inside the Surrogate Industry, in
TEST TUBE WOMEN 99 (R. Arditti, R. Klein & S. Minden eds. 1984).
125. Pierce, supra note 70, at 3003.
126. WARNOCK REPORT, supra note 3, at §§ 4.10, 8.10.
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surrogate motherhood is quite comparable to that posed by AID.
Adoptions, divorce and blended families each involve some separation
of genetic, gestational and social parenting. Surrogate motherhood is
simply a no greater threat to traditional family values than changes
that are already occurring due to social, economic or demographic rea-
sons.12 7 Furthermore, one must remember that the primary objective
of surrogate motherhood is to produce a child to be raised by a couple
unable to procreate by themselves. The commissioning couple seeks
to create a traditional family structure in the only way available. Thus
surrogate motherhood actually increases the overall number of family
units within society.
B. Nonconsequentialist Objections to Surrogate Motherhood
The second set of criticisms rests on the broad assertion that surro-
gate motherhood is inconsistent with respect for human dignity. Crit-
ics assert that surrogacy practices sanction the treating of individuals
as means to achieving an end rather than as independent objects of
moral concern. The surrogate thus becomes an incubator in which
others can attain their goal of procreation. Treating individuals as
means instead of ends in themselves was the basis for such now-dis-
credited practices as slavery and forced medical experimentation.s2 8
Arguments pertaining to human dignity are difficult to respond to
because they are so abstract. To agree that individuals should not be
treated as means to achieve selfish ends does little to resolve particu-
lar cases. The proposition contains no readily discernible principle of
limitation. One who hires a gardener uses him to achieve a desired
end. Yet, surely all contracts of employment are not immoral. Closer
to the point, sperm and egg donors are means whereby infertile
couples may achieve their desired ends of procreation. Neither the
Warnock Committee nor society at large considers donor roles as
demeaning to human dignity.
In reflecting upon whether a particular relationship demeans
human dignity, one should distinguish between the relationship itself
and the treatment of particular individual participants. Some rela-
tionships, such as those involved in slavery and forced medical experi-
mentation, are morally objectionable regardless of how well the
individuals are treated. These activities are justifiably censured be-
cause they deny the individual the degree of autonomy essential to
personal dignity. Surrogate motherhood is ethically distinguishable
127. Robertson, supra note 109, at 30.
128. Krimmel, supra note 63, at 36. Some feminists fear that surrogate motherhood
perpetuates the woman-as-breeder sex role stereotype and thereby hinders the
development of true equality between men and women. G. CoREA, THE MOTHER
MAcHiNE 213-49 (1985).
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from slavery precisely on this point. The informed and voluntary par-
ticipation of the surrogate preserves her dignity as an individual.
The vast majority of human relationships are not inherently undig-
nified. Still, individuals within these relationships may or may not be
treated with the proper measure of respect. In this regard, the surro-
gate mother is no different from any other individual who provides
services for others. Aside from the slavery-type arrangements, human
relationships are neither inherently possessed or dispossessed of "re-
spect." Rather, respect is a function of individual treatment.
A second argument is more focused. It maintains that surrogate
parenting fosters a commodification of parenthood. By creating a
market for genetic and gestational services, surrogate motherhood
treats procreation as a tradeable commodity. 129 Parenthood and ulti-
mately life itself become less dignified when reduced to commercial
barter. This criticism centers on the particular services provided by
the surrogate mother rather than a broad and general attack on using
others.
The persuasiveness of the commodification argument depends
largely on intuitive normative judgments about which facets of life
should not be traded. Once the argument is reduced to subjective
value judgments, there is little room for logical analysis. One ulti-
mately is forced to accept or reject the proposition that respect for life
is diminished when a woman receives payment for carrying a child for
another. Several points should be kept in mind, however. There is
nothing intrinsically immoral about a person receiving pay for provid-
ing services for others. This is the backbone of our economy. Further-
more, a substantial amount of commercial trafficking presently exists
with regard to parenting. Sperm donors, and presumably egg donors,
are paid for their genetic contribution to the procreational process.1 3 0
Wet nurses, day care centers and nannies represent varying accepted
degrees of commercialized social parenting. Foster parents commonly
receive state assistance for providing parental care. It is remarkable
that Great Britain, a country that tolerates prostitution,13 1 is shocked
129. Prichard, supra note 15, at 352. The proposition that certain things should not be
traded has been used to attack broadly the "law and economics" movement in the
United States. See Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideol-
ogy in the Coase Theorum, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669, 687-88 (1979).
130. Some have objected to the payment of fees to sperm donors. One concern is that
donors might be tempted to falsify or withhold information so that they will be
accepted as donors. WARNOCK REPORT, supra note 3, at § 4.27. Another fear is
that "commercial agencies cannot be expected to give the entirely disinterested
advice and counseling that couples using these services greatly need." HUMAN
PROCREATION, supra note 3, at 43. These objections are consequentialist in nature
and do not suggest the absence of human dignity in either donating or receiving
germinal material.
131. Prostitution, as such, is not a crime in the United Kingdom. A. SION, PROSTITU-
TION AND THE LAW 52 (1977); J. SMITH & B. HOGAN, CRIMINAL LAw 429 (5th ed.
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by surrogate motherhood. If a woman is free to sell her body for rec-
reational sex, why condemn her offer of gestational services to allevi-
ate infertility?
It is the provision of gestational services that distinguishes surro-
gate motherhood. Is there something unique about gestation that sug-
gests that it alone should not be provided in exchange for payment?
The commodification argument, in the final analysis, rests entirely on
a romantic vision of motherhood that obscures the fundamental na-
ture and object of the transaction. 32 Surrogacy creates life and family
in circumstances where they are not otherwise possible. This affirms
rather than cheapens society's respect for life.
The case for prohibiting surrogacy practices from a consequential-
ist perspective is an especially weak one. The benefits to the child and
commissioning couple vastly outweigh any potential risks. Possible
exploitation of surrogate mothers can be addressed by regulatory
measures short of total prohibition. The prohibition of surrogate
parenting practices must be justified, if at all, in nonconsequentialist
terms. Given the rather abstract nature of these concerns, the
strength of the argument ultimately depends on individual values.
The nonconsequentialist concerns do not convince me that surrogate
motherhood is unethical. The informed and voluntary participation of
the parties in creating life does not diminish its value. On the con-
trary, surrogate motherhood emphasizes the worth of children in our
society and brings the unique experiences of parenthood to those who
would otherwise be deprived.
V. GUIDELINES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICTS: DAMAGES
AND SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
My argument has been that as the product of autonomous adults,
surrogacy arrangements should not be proscribed unless there are
convincing reasons for doing so. The previous section concluded that
the reasons most commonly offered are lacking. Accordingly, surro-
gacy agreements should not be considered illegal. As with any agree-
ment, surrogacy arrangements will inevitably give rise to disputes.
1983). The regulatory pattern of the Surrogacy Arrangements Act and the law of
prostitution is quite similar. Neither surrogacy nor prostitution are crimes, as
such, but other criminal laws do discourage both practices. Parallel treatment of
prostitution and surrogacy is unfortunate. If surrogacy is not totally prohibited, it
is likely to continue in some form. The primary anticipated effect of the Surro-
gacy Arrangements Act will be to remove professionals from the process thereby
encouraging uncounseled agreements in a matter that demands careful planning.
132. But see Annas, supra note 10, at 31 ("that the woman who gestates a child should
be considered the child's legal mother for all purposes-is not based on antis-
cience, anachronistic, or sentimental views of motherhood. Rather it is a recogni-
tion of the gestational mother's greater biological contribution to the child,
including risks and physical contributions of the nine months of pregnancy....").
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This section offers guidelines for resolving many of the anticipated
conflicts. Ideally, these guidelines would be part of a comprehensive
legislative package. In the absence of specific statutory regulation,
however, they could be invoked by courts seeking common law
solutions.
Most of the potential conflicts center on three situations: (1) ef-
forts to control the prenatal conduct of the surrogate mother; (2) the
surrogate mother's refusal to relinquish custody of the child; and
(3) the father's refusal to accept custody of his child. In each of these
situations, an award of money damages may validate the legitimacy of
the agreement and compensate for some economic injury. Damages
fail, however, to protect the paramount interests at stake: the health
and custody of the child. Accordingly, specific performance will be
sought in most instances. Yet there are two overriding factors that
will color a court's view of a request for specific performance. First,
the contract affects the interests of an innocent and helpless third
party-the child. Courts are not likely to adhere rigidly to contract
principles without an independent assessment of the best interests of
the child. Second, enforcement of surrogacy agreements will often in-
volve the performance of uniquely personal services, great intrusions
upon the individual, or constant supervision. These factors generally
dissuade courts from granting specific performance.1 33
A. Controlling the Surrogate's Prenatal Conduct
Surrogacy agreements commonly contain provisions purporting to
control the surrogate mother's prenatal conduct. Many provisions are
restrictive in nature such as those prohibiting the consumption of alco-
hol, tobacco and drugs during pregnancy. Others require affirmative
conduct such as regular prenatal physical examinations or submitting
to certain tests. Both these proscriptive and prescriptive provisions
are designed to protect the health of the fetus. The most controversial
provisions concern the surrogate's right to an abortion. The surrogate
generally agrees not to abort the fetus unless, if in the opinion of the
inseminating physician, the fetus is physiologically abnormal or an
abortion is needed to preserve the physical health of the mother.134
1. Promoting the Healthy Development of the Fetus
It is extremely doubtful that provisions regulating the surrogate's
early prenatal conduct can be effectively enforced. Drinking, smoking
and drug use are often difficult to discover. Even if detected, the issue
of remedy is problematic. Specific performance of these restrictions
133. 1 J. CHITTY, supra note 64, at 1771-77, 1781; E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 67, at
§ 12.7.
134. Brophy, supra note 8, at 280-82.
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would require the type of constant monitoring that courts generally
shun. Monetary damages for breach of contract are not satisfactory
since they do not prevent the harm to the child from occurring. Fur-
thermore, they are difficult to prove. It is one thing to accept a gen-
eral linkage between a mother's prenatal consumption of alcohol and
tobacco and a child's development difficulties. It is quite another to
establish to a reasonable degree of medical certainty a causal relation-
ship between consumption and a particular injury.1 3 5
Perhaps the contract could anticipate these problems by providing
for reasonable liquidated damages. Additional incentives for compli-
ance could be built into the schedule of payment. If blood and urine
tests taken during pregnancy reveal no prohibited substances, the sur-
rogate would become entitled to a financial reward. Structured pay-
ment schedules and liquidated damages are at best, however, limited
inducements for compliance. Realistically, there is very little the com-
missioning couple can do to guarantee that the surrogate properly
cares for herself and her child during the early stages of pregnancy.
There are some American decisions that could justify more aggres-
sive judicial intervention in the later stages of pregnancy. In recent
years the simultaneous narrowing of the doctrine of parental tort im-
munity and the expansion of liability for prenatal injuries have pro-
duced suits by children against their parents for injuries caused by
negligent prenatal conduct. In Grodin v. Grodin,l-3 a child was per-
mitted to sue his mother for her negligently taking drugs during preg-
nancy that caused him permanent physical injury. In fact, injunctive
relief has been awarded in exceptional cases. In Jefferson v. Griffin
Spaulding County Hospital,13 7 an expectant mother refused to con-
sent to a caesarean section delivery. Her doctors were convinced that
a vaginal delivery would result in the death of the child. Over the
135. See Furnish, Prenatal Exposure to Fetally Toxic Work Environments: The Di-
lemma of the 1978 Pregnancy Amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,66 IowA L. REV. 63, 85-86 (1980) ("proof problem in [prenatal tort] cases may
be overwhelming."); Note, Birth Defects Caused by Prenatal Exposure to Work-
place Hazards: The Interface of Title VII with OSHA and Tort Law, 12 J.L. REF.
237, 256 (1979) ("Proof of causation of birth defects is especially difficult because
of the technological problems involved.") Establishing a causal nexus between
the surrogate's conduct and the child's injury raises the prospect of a tort action.
The Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act, 1976, ch. 28, would appear to
preclude an action by the child under English law. Pierce, Civil Liability For
Pre-Natal Injuries, 40 MOD. L. REV. 141 (1977). It is not clear, however, whether
the commissioning couple could maintain an action for their damages. Cf. Thake
v. Maurice, [1984] 2 All E.R. 513 (Married couple allowed to collect costs of
healthy baby's birth and upkeep from doctor who negligently failed to warn hus-
band that vasectomy could be followed by natural regaining of fertility).
136. 102 Mich. App. 396, 301 N.W.2d 869 (Ct. App. 1980). See generally Beal, Can ISue
Mommy? An Analysis of a Woman's Tort Liability for Prenatal Injuries to Her
Child Born Alive, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 325 (1984).
137. 247 Ga. 87, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981). See Robertson, supra note 16, at 450-58.
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mother's religious objection, the court ordered her to submit to sur-
gery to protect the child's life.138
These cases reflect a policy of concern for the child's physical well
being that could persuade a court to order specific performance of cer-
tain provisions of a surrogacy agreement. If the provision protects a
child late in the pregnancy, specific performance would be consistent
with the best interests of the child. The concerns that might lead a
court to deny a request for specific performance at an earlier stage of
pregnancy would give way to the increased need to protect the unborn
child.
2. Regulating the Abortion Decision
Contractual provisions could call for the surrogate to refrain from
abortion or, in an exceptional case, require her to abort the fetus.
Neither of these provisions are likely to be specifically enforceable.
The law presently gives a woman the exclusive right to decide
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy at its early stages. During
the first trimester a woman may abort a fetus over the objection of
even her husband.139 An unrelated sperm donor can hardly expect
more favorable treatment than a spouse.140 There are also no re-
ported cases in which a court ordered a woman to abort her fetus over
her objection.141
The commissioning couple could argue that the surrogate waived
or, more accurately, sold her right to exclusive control over the abor-
tion decision by signing the surrogacy agreement. The voluntary re-
linquishrnent of rights is routinely enforced in the criminal law
context. In the United States, for example, a criminal defendant may
waive constitutional protections against unreasonable searches, the
right to trial by jury, and the privilege against self-incrimination.142
Commercial trafficking in privacy interests also occurs on a daily ba-
sis. Indeed, the mass marketing of the Baby Cotton story was made
possible primarily by the surrogate's sale of her privacy interests. The
138. Shortly before the surgery was to be performed, the placenta moved thereby
eliminating the need for a caesarean section. Mrs. Jefferson told reporters, "I
told the people it was the Lord, but they don't believe it. The Lord healed her. I
stood on God's word and it came through." Atlanta Journal Constitution, Feb. 28,
1982, at B2, col. 1.
139. Paton v. British Pregnancy Advisory Serv. Trustees, [1978] 2 All E.R. 987;
Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
140. Jones v. Smith, 278 So. 2d 339 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (Potential putative father
has no right to restrain natural mother from terminating her pregnancy).
141. In re Smith, 16 Md. App. 209, 295 A.2d 238 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972); In re Mary
P., 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2140 (N.Y. Fain. Ct., Queens County, Dec. 11, 1981).
Both courts denied parents' requests for orders compelling their minor daughters
to abort fetuses.
142. E.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent search). See
Simons, Rescinding a Waiver of Constitutional Rights, 68 GEO. L. J. 919 (1980).
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commissioning couple would argue that absent coercion, fraud, or du-
ress, the surrogate's voluntary relinquishment of her right to abort
should be specifically enforceable.
There is a certain amount of surface logic to this argument. None-
theless, it will ultimately fail. Under the current Anglo-American law
of abortion, it is difficult to imagine a court ordering a woman in the
early stages of pregnancy to carry and give birth to a child she did not
want to deliver. The rationale that gives rise to a right to terminate a
pregnancy is quite similar to that frequently invoked to deny specific
performance. The abortion cases emphasize the uniquely personal na-
ture and the serious consequences of the decision to bear a child.143
The courts specifically refer to the emotional and physical implica-
tions of pregnancy and delivery, as well as the demands of child rear-
ing. While the surrogate would not be directly affected by child
rearing concerns, she alone must face the risks of pregnancy and deliv-
ery. Regardless of the circumstances of conception or the intended
allocation of child rearing responsibilities, the surrogate retains a sig-
nificant interest in deciding whether to carry a fetus to term. An or-
der prohibiting an abortion would therefore demand the performance
of the most personal of services and could impose a severe hardship on
the surrogate. Thus, specific performance of an agreement restricting
abortion is not likely. 44
The aggrieved couple is probably limited to the conventional tort
and contract remedy of damages. Their theory of recovery in tort
would focus on the intentional conduct of the surrogate that she knew
would cause severe emotional distress. In the United States, this the-
ory is well established and is known as the intentional infliction of
emotional distress.145 One element of the action is that the defend-
ant's conduct be deemed "outrageous." Given the degree of protection
afforded a woman's right to abort, it is unlikely that a surrogate
mother's decision to terminate her pregnancy could be considered out-
rageous. The surrogate is carrying a child she does not intend to raise.
If a married woman may abort a fetus over the objection of her hus-
143. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973); Paton v. British Pregnancy Advisory
Serv. Trustees, [1979] 3 All E.R. 987.
144. A closer question is posed when the surrogate is carrying a child conceived by the
commissioning couple. In this situation the surrogate bears no genetic relation-
ship to the fetus. Arguably, this fact weakens her claim to dispose of the fetus at
will. Again, however, it is the consequences of pregnancy and not genetic rela-
tionships that appear to underly the right of privacy recognized in Roe. This fac-
tor remains constant in surrogacy arrangements regardless of whether AID or
embryo transfer techniques are used. Thus, I believe the surrogate would retain
control over the abortion decision even in cases where she is not genetically re-
lated to the fetus.
145. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 46 (1965). See Givelber, The Right to Mini-
mum Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction
of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 COL. L. REV. 42 (1982).
1986]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
band, the surrogate's decision to abort could hardly be labeled outra-
geous.146 Though less thoroughly developed, this tort is recognized in
England when the mental distress is accompanied by some physical
injury.147 However, the abortion would likely be considered justifi-
able conduct for basically the same reasons it would not be labeled
outrageous in the United States.
Damages for breach of contract appears a more promising avenue
of redress. The couple certainly would be entitled to restitution for
sums already paid. This is a small amount, however, compared to the
enormous disappointment and distress the abortion is likely to have
caused. The general rule that contract damages do not compensate for
non-pecuniary losses is subject to an increasing number of exceptions.
Courts have awarded damages for mental distress when damages were
within the contemplation of the parties as a foreseeable consequence
of the breach of contract.148 There are few situations in which mental
distress is more clearly foreseeable than when a woman breaches her
promise not to abort a man's child.
All in all, the commissioning couple should recognize the precari-
ous position they occupy with regard to enforcing contractual provi-
sions regulating prenatal conduct. Specific performance is probably
not a viable option. Damages for breach of contract remains a theoret-
ical, though inadequate, remedy. Money is simply no substitute for a
healthy child. The extent to which money damages is a remedy at all
146. Przybyla v. Przybyla, 87 Wis. 2d 441, 275 N.W.2d 112 (Ct. App. 1978). (Husband
denied recovery on claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress because
his wife's decision to have an abortion cannot be deemed "outrageous"). The
strongest case for recognizing a tort action would be when the surrogate aborts
the fetus for the sole purpose of inflicting severe emotional distress. In this un-
likely instance, the surrogate's "knowledge that the [commissioning couple] is pe-
culiarly susceptible to emotional distress" is relevant to an evaluation of the
outrageousness of her conduct. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 46 comment
F (1965). A jury might also be outraged in instances where the fetus was not
genetically related to the surrogate. In this situation a jury might feel that the
fetus was not "hers" to abort. The fear that awarding tort damages would "chill"
the exercise of a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy could be overriden by
her specific illicit motive in the same way that "actual malice" supports tort
awards in American libel cases. Cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964) (Public official can collect damages for defamatory falsehood relating to
official duties if he proves actual malice, i.e., that the statement was published
with knowledge that it was false and with reckless disregard of whether it was
true or false).
147. Wilkinson v. Downton, [1897] 2 Q.B. 57; Janvier v. Sweeny, [1919] 2 K.B. 316; H.
STREET, THE LAW OF TORTS 22-23 (7th ed. 1983).
148. Perry v. Sidney Phillips & Son, [1982] 1 All E.R. 1005 (awarding damages for dis-
tress caused to purchaser by the surveyor's negligent failure to report defects in
the house); Green v. Sudakin, 81 Mich. App. 545, 265 N.W.2d 411 (Mich. Ct. App.
1978) (damages for mental anguish are recoverable for breach of contract to ster-
ilize plaintiff).
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depends on the uncertain solvency of the surrogate.149
B. Custody Disputes
Custody disputes have arisen when the surrogate mother refused
to surrender her child 5 0 and when the commissioning couple refused
to accept the child.151 These disputes should not be resolved by simple
reference to contract principles. The child is not a party to the con-
tract and is unable to protect his interests. As in other instances
where custody is contested the court's paramount concern must be the
welfare of the child.152
The most common conflict occurs when both the surrogate and the
commissioning couple want custody. Traditionally, courts resolved
custody disputes by presuming that children of tender years are better
off if placed in the custody of their mother.153 Although this is less
true today as a matter of doctrine,154 data indicates that a maternal
preference remains the norm in practice.15 5 As applied to surrogacy
arrangements, this preference would usually lead to the surrogate be-
ing awarded custody in contested cases. At least where conception is
achieved by artificial insemination, as opposed to embryo donation,
there is no question as to who is the mother. The surrogate is both
genetically and gestationally related to the child.
If an embryo is transplanted to the surrogate, the identity of the
mother is less clear. In that situation, the surrogate has a gestational,
but no genetic, tie to the child. In the first reported case of this type, a
trial court in Michigan recently ruled in an uncontested proceeding
that the genetic mother would be considered the legal mother of the
149. A source of recovery could be provided for through insurance or bonding. Pre-
sumably these matters could be taken care of in the agreement.
150. A v. C, 1978 Far. 170; Noyes v. Thrane, No. CF7614 (Los Angeles County, Cal.
Sup. Ct., Feb. 20, 1981); Morrow, Surrogate Mother Gets Custody of Fought-Over
Child, Los Angeles Daily J., June 5, 1981, at 1, col. 2.
151. For a discussion of the incident involving Judy Stivers and Alexander Malahoff,
see supra note 108.
152. Eg. Surrogate Parenting Assoc. v. Kentucky e= rel Armstrong, 703 S.W.2d 209,
213 (Ky. 1986) (dicta).
153. Ex Parte Divine, 398 So. 2d 686 (Ala. 1981); Re W (A Minor), 126 Sol. J. 725 (1982).
154. Many statutes purport neutrality between claims of fathers and mothers for cus-
tody of their children. E.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 107.137(3) (1983). Several states
have judicially abandoned the tender years presumption. E.g., Burks v. Burks,
564 P.2d 71 (Alaska 1977); Bazemore v. Davis, 394 A.2d 1377 (D.C. 1978).
155. Weitzman & Dixon, Child Custody Awards: Legal Standards and Empirical Pat-
terns for Child Custody, Support and Visitation After Divorce, 12 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 473, 501-05 (1979). It may be, however, that awarding custody to the mother
is prompted by a desire not to disrupt the child's existing emotional ties. J. EEKE-
LAAR, E. CLIVE, K. CLARKE & S. RAiKEs, CUSTODY AFrER DIVORCE: THE DISPOSi-
TION OF CUSTODY IN DIVORCE CASES IN GREAT BRITAIN 13.29 (1977).
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child.156 The Warnock Committee, on the other hand, suggests that
gestational parentage should prevail over genetic parentage. The re-
port recommends that the husband who consents to his wife's artificial
insemination be considered the legal father of the resulting child.157
In considering egg and embryo donation, it suggested that the woman
giving birth be given all legal rights pertaining to child rearing, instead
of the gamete donor.158 The Committee would confer upon the surro-
gate all child rearing rights even in cases where the egg or embryo is
donated by the commissioning mother.159 Under this proposal, the
commissioning couple would have no claim to the child despite their
genetic parentage and the original intent of all parties that the genetic
parents raise the child.
The Warnock Committee's recommendations regarding legal
parenthood in the AID, embryo donation, and egg donation contexts
should not govern surrogacy arrangements. Defining motherhood in
terms of gestation and delivery is consistent with the intent of the par-
ties in most instances involving AID, embryo donation, or egg dona-
tion. Semen and egg donors ordinarily do not aspire to parental rights
and obligations. In surrogacy arrangements, the original intent of the
parties is quite different. It is the semen donor and his wife, not the
surrogate, who intend to become legal parents.
It is this fundamental difference in intent that gives the commis-
sioning couple a strong equitable claim to be considered the legal par-
ents of the child. The Warnock Committee's proposals regarding AID,
embryo donation, and egg donation implicitly recognize the central
importance of the parties' intent. This factor is equally compelling in
surrogacy arrangements. The agreement is entered into with the clear
understanding by all parties that the commissioning couple will raise
the child as their own. Indeed, without this agreement a child would
never be conceived. The commissioning couple relies on this under-
standing when they perform their obligations under the agreement.
Agreements regarding custody are not, of course, enforceable un-
less they are in the child's best interests. A presumption in favor of
enforcement is warranted for surrogacy agreements. The commission-
ing couple has incurred substantial financial expense and emotional
commitment to have a child conceived. The natural father and his
wife have demonstrated that they very much want a child and proba-
bly have the economic resources to provide a secure environment.
This is not to say that the surrogate is unfit to raise a child, but only
that the commissioning couple is at least as likely as the surrogate to
156. Smith v. Jones, 85-532014 DZ (3d Jud. Dist., Mich., Mar. 14, 1986) reported in
Annas, supra note 10.
157. WARNOCK REPORT, supra note 3, at §§ 4.17, 4.25.
158. I& at §§ 6.8, 7.6.
159. Id. at § 8.20.
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offer a loving and nourishing home. 60 If the best interests of the child
do not clearly point to the surrogate, the considerations of reliance
and intent support awarding custody of the child to the commissioning
couple.
A presumption favoring enforcement could be rebutted. A signifi-
cant change in circumstances could support an award of custody to the
surrogate. For example, if before the child was born the father died or
the commissioning couple divorced, the claim for custody by the surro-
gate would be stronger. A custody dispute could also reveal facts
about the commissioning couple that indicate they are not as well
suited as the surrogate to raise the child. In one American case, evi-
dence disclosed that the wife of the child's father had formerly been a
man who underwent a sex change operation. Upon that revelation the
case was settled with the surrogate mother retaining custody and the
father receiving access rights.16 1
A rebuttable presumption for enforcing a surrogacy agreement
would also help resolve those rare cases where neither the father nor
the mother wants custody. The commissioning couple would be pre-
sumed to have all parental obligations. If they failed to discharge their
duties, then formal neglect proceedings could be initiated. It must be
emphasized that however tragic, the problem of child neglect is not
unique to surrogate motherhood. Unfortunately, it exists within all
procreational patterns.
These guidelines do not purport to cover all contingencies. They
do, however, illustrate that conflicts arising from surrogacy agree-
ments can be resolved in a principled manner. The problems of en-
forcement may challenge the ingenuity of counsel and courts, but they
are manageable. As they have done for centuries, courts can adapt
long standing principles with a sensitivity to new circumstances.
VI. CONCLUSION
The British response to the practice of surrogate motherhood has
been described accurately as "moral panic."'162 The Warnock Commit-
tee's recommendations and the Australian legislation that declares all
surrogacy agreements illegal stems from an intuitive premise that
such practices are inherently immoral or unethical. The foundation
for this premise is elusive. Who is injured by surrogacy agreements?
It is certainly not the child who would otherwise not be born. The
160. In awarding custody to the father, Mr. Justice Latey necessarily concluded that
the father and his wife were fit parents. Re a Baby (1985) Times, Jan. 15 (Fam.
Div.).
161. Noyes v. Thrane, No. CF7614 (Los Angeles County, Cal. Sup. Ct., filed Feb. 20,
1981); L. ANDREws, supra note 8, at 229.
162. The words are those of Professor Michael Freeman, University College London.
Helm, Webster, Wilsher and Hosenball, supra note 2, at 15, col. 1.
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child gains life and faces no greater risks than those faced by all chil-
dren, regardless of parentage. The parties to the surrogacy agreement
act voluntarily. The commissioning couple wants a child and the sur-
rogate agrees to help them. Each of the parties is aware of the risks
associated with their respective undertakings and willingly incurs the
risks. In a society that values liberty, governmental intrusions upon
voluntary agreements should be restricted. To the extent one fears
the potential exploitation of the surrogate, judicial or administrative
regulation offers protection while respecting a degree of autonomy.
The amorphous alleged harms to society and human dignity are diffi-
cult to articulate much less prove. In the final analysis, surrogacy ar-
rangements bring a child into the world through the voluntary
cooperation of three parties. Life is not cheapened by this process, it is
created and cherished.
The Surrogacy Arrangements Act proposes a compromise position.
It appears to tolerate all surrogacy agreements except those profes-
sionally arranged. Its myopic concern with the potential dangers of
commercial agencies leaves many problems unresolved and creates
some new ones. It totally ignores a host of family law issues that will
arise from surrogacy arrangements permitted by the Act. The Act
fails to address completely the evils of commercialism. Privately ne-
gotiated agreements involving substantial fees remain permissible. A
troublesome consequence of the limited scope of the Act is its encour-
agement of do-it-yourself agreements. If surrogacy agreements are ac-
ceptable in any form, professional assistance is desirable.
Unlike Great Britain and Victoria, Australia, the United States has
not hastily condemned surrogate parenting as immoral. Recent deci-
sions reflect a tolerance, if not an acceptance, of the practice. Yet, the
United States has not clearly come to grips with the myriad issues
presented by surrogate motherhood. Cautiously worded judicial opin-
ions and legislative inaction lead parties into a world of uncertainty as
they attempt to navigate through a labyrinth of laws enacted for dif-
ferent purposes. The status quo is intolerable-the stakes are too
high.
Through this web of misplaced moral condemnation and legal am-
biguity shines a ray of hope from the North. The Ontario Report ad-
dresses the subject of surrogate motherhood sensibly, sensitively, and
comprehensively. It provides the basis for a legislative package that
accommodates the legitimate aspirations of childless couples while ad-
dressing the fears of those concerned with exploitation and commer-
cialization of procreation.
As long as couples want but are unable to have children, surrogate
parenting will exist. The challenge to the legal system is to provide
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guidance so that parties may avoid disputes and allow a just resolution
of those conflicts that do arise. It is to this challenge that more energy
must be directed.
